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I observe the slights and degradations cast by arrogant persons
upon laborers, the poor, and upon Negroes, and the like;
Walt Whitman'
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the employment-at-will rule2 in many jurisdictions, 3 a private
1. Whitman, "I Sit and Look Out," THE TREASURY OF AMERICAN POETRY 263
(N. Sullivan ed. 1978). Whitman may well have intended the phrase "the like" to refer
to homosexuals. For a discussion of Whitman's homosexuality, see J. KAPLAN, WALT
WHITMAN: A LIFE (1980).
2. See text accompanying notes 14-47. This article addresses the plight of private
employees. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution protect
homosexuals working for public employers from discrimination. Singer v. U.S. Civ.
Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034
(1977); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Rivera, Our
Straight Laced-Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HAST]NGS L.J. 799, 813-818 (1980); Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Prefer-
ence Law, 30 DRAKE L. REv. 311, 317-18 (1981).
3. For discussion of the status of the employment-at-will rule in the 50 states and
Puerto Rico, see L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL ch. 10 (1985).
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employer may fire an employee at any time without notice for any rea-
son, including homosexuality.4 Indeed, according to the classic formu-
lation of the rule, an employer may fire an employee-at-will for any
reason in the absence of a contractual or statutory provision to the
contrary. Most statutory provisions limiting an employer's right to
discharge workers afford no protection to homosexuals. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the courts uni-
formly hold that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 5-which
prohibits private and public employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin-fails to prohibit employ-
ment discrimination against either effeminate males6 or homosexuals.7
The primary rationale of these decisions is that Congress, in passing
Title VII, did not intend to protect homosexuals against employment
discrimination. In addition, courts have held that neither 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, which is the present codification of the Civil Rights Act of
1866,8 nor the California Fair Employment Practices Act 9 afford any
4. Payne v. Western & A. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). See Martin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895); 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 684 at 224 (1960); 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
1017, at 129-130 (3d ed. 1967).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Section 2000e-2(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would... adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Section 2000e-2 sets out similar nondiscrimination requirements with respect to em-
ployment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs in subsections (b), (c),
and (d) respectively.
Proposed bills to amend Title VII to cover sexual preference discrimination include:
H.R. 2074, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 8269, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.
8268, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 7775, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5239,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 4794, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 2998, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 451, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5452, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 2667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
6. Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1979).
7. De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
8. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (which prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, color, and, possibly, national origin).
9. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (similar to many state fair employment laws). Gay Law Students
1988]
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protection to homosexuals. These decisions rest on the rationale that
respective legislative bodies intended to exclude homosexuals from the
scope of their laws. Through these rulings, courts advised gay activists
that the legislature, not the judiciary, was the proper forum for their
employment discrimination claims.
With resort to the political process, however, homosexuals encoun-
tered only modest success. Both Wisconsin and the District of Colum-
bia declared illegal employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or preference." In addition, New York City and other mu-
nicipalities passed various ordinances protecting homosexuals from
employment discrimination. 1 Nevertheless, such jurisdictions repre-
sent the minority. Most state legislatures and Congress resist gay ac-
tivists' attempts to redress the legitimate grievances of homosexuals. 12
The hostility and indifference of most legislative bodies illustrates that
any immediate protection of privately employed homosexuals will have
to come from a source other than the traditional civil rights laws.
During the past fifteen years, the judiciary has imposed major limita-
tions on the traditional employment-at-will rule. 3 Many jurisdictions
now protect employees against some types of discharges, and there is
widespread recognition that further protection is forthcoming. The
purpose of this article is to examine the emerging law of unjust dismis-
sal to determine whether its development will provide a remedy for
homosexuals fired solely because of their sexual orientation.
Part II of the Article reviews the major developments in the law of
unjust dismissal. Part III examines the contract exception to the em-
ployment-at-will rule. In this section the author argues that courts
should construe both the implied-in-law and implied-in-fact theories of
employment contracts to require just cause for discharge. Addition-
ally, the author provides examples of what constitutes just cause for the
also held that California Labor Code §§ 1101 and 1102 prohibited arbitrary employ-
ment discrimination against manifest homosexuals. Id. The Attorney General of Cali-
fornia recently concluded that these sections also prohibited employment discrimination
on the basis of undisclosed or suspected homosexual orientation. Attorney General of
California, Opinion No. 85-404, p. 5 (1986).
10. D.C. Code Encycl. § 6-2221 (West Supp. 1978-79); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 111.31,
111.32, 111.36 & 111.37 (West Supp. 1983-84).
11. New York, N.Y. Municipal Code B1-7.2.
12. See, e.g., De Santis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F. Supp. 327, 329
(9th Cir. 1979).
13. For a history of these developments, see L. LARSEN, UNJUsT DIsMISSAL
§§ 2.06, 2.07 (1986).
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termination of a homosexual. Part IV discusses the public policy ex-
ception to the employment-at-will rule. The author concludes that
strong policies favoring free speech and the exercise of political rights,
as well as the policy against discrimination in general, should support a
homosexual's cause of action for unjust dismissal. The final section
briefly addresses other available theories of recovery. These avenues of
recourse, however, offer less promise to homosexuals because courts
have not been receptive to similar claims brought by heterosexuals.
II. THE LAW OF UNJUST DISMISSAL
A. The Employment-at- Will Rule
The employment-at-will rule applies to approximately sixty-seven
percent of American employees.14 The rule provides that "[a]ll [em-
ployers] may dismiss their employees at will... for good cause, for no
cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of
legal wrong."' 5 Technically, the rule establishes a presumption that
14. Of American employees, 18% are unionized, and approximately 16% are fed-
eral and state employees. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986, Table 662 at 393 (total labor force),
Table 713 at 424 (union membership), Table 692 at 410 (non-agricultural establish-
ments). See Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the
Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979).
Union members in the private sector are protected from unjust dismissal by collective
bargaining agreements. Almost 80% of such agreements provide that covered employ-
ees can only be terminated for "just cause." 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIA-
TIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 40:1 (Apr. 10, 1975). For a discussion of "just cause"
protection for unionized employees, see Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust
Dismissal. Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 499-508 (1976); Weyand, Present
Status of Individual Employee Rights, N.Y.U. 22ND ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 171, 186-201
(1970).
Federal civilian employees are protected by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5
U.S.C. § 7513(a), (b) (1982). See Chaturvedi, Legal Protection Available to Federal Em-
ployees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 287, 290-307 (1968). State em-
ployees are protected by tenure and government unions, civil service systems and by
state and by the Constitution. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW
§ 5.4 (1976); J. WEISBERGER, JOB SECURITY AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 9-19, 45-65 (2d
ed 1973); Lowy, Constitutional Limitations on the Dismissal of Public Employees, 43
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1976); Vaughn, Public Employees and the Right to Disobey, 29
HAST. L.J. 261 (1977).
15. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1894), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). See 3 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 684, at 224 (1960); 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 1017, at 129-130 (3d ed. 1967).
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when an employment contract fails to specify a duration for the
worker's services, either the employer or the employee may terminate
the employment relationship at will. 6 Since few employment con-
tracts specify a duration, the vast majority of employees in the United
States risk the possibility of summary dismissal.
To the surprise of many who have read the cases attesting to the
precedent behind the rule, 7 the rule is of relatively recent origin.18
There was little conformity in the cases until 1877, when Horace G.
Wood published his Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant."'
Wood inaccurately declared that an indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and the discharged employee carries the burden of prov-
ing otherwise.20 Many courts adopted Wood's theory, and the employ-
ment-at-will rule was born.
, Numerous reasons explain the rapid acceptance of the employment-
at-will rule. Legal scholars justified the rule on the basis that it enabled
courts to reach consistent decisions and avoid a tedious factual analysis
of each case.21 The prevalent laissez-faire economic theory of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, often couched in the rhetoric
of the absolute freedom of the employer and employee to contract on
whatever terms they chose without governmental interference, has also
contributed to the acceptance of the rule.22 In fact, the Supreme Court
enshrined the employer's absolute right to discharge as a constitution-
ally protected property right. In Adair v. United States2 3 the Court
16. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1877). See Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
17. For the history of the employment-at-will rule, see 1 C. LABATT, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 159 (2d ed. 1913); Feinman, The De-
velopment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AMER. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
18. Feinman, supra note 17, at 120.
19. L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 2.03 (1986).
20. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, § 134 at 272
(1877). Wood cited the following four cases as authority: Wilder v. United States (Wil.
der's Case), 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869); De Briar v. Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v.
Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115
(1871). Scholars have shown that Wood's formulation of the rule was not supported by
his claimed authorities. See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 335, 341-345 (1974).
21. L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 2.04 (1986).
22. See Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-1825 (1980);
Feinman, supra note 17, at 124, 129-130.
23. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); see also Coppage v. Kansas, 236
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/3
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held that a federal law barring common carriers from dismissing em-
ployees for union membership unconstitutionally interfered with the
employer's freedom of contract and constituted a taking of property in
violation of the fifth amendment.24
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation2 the Court rejected
the laissez-faire philosophy of Adair and applied the formal law of con-
tracts, including the principles of mutuality of obligation and consider-
ation, to sustain the rule of employment-at-will.2 6 Courts have
interpreted mutuality of obligation, which requires that a contract bind
both parties, to mean that since an employee can quit his job at will,
the employer is likewise free to terminate the contract by firing the
employee at will.2 7 Moreover, courts consistently held that "perma-
nent" employment contracts, in which an employer agrees to retain an
employee so long as his work is satisfactory, lacked mutuality and were
unenforceable.2" Most contemporary commentators, however, agree
that mutuality of obligation is an anachronistic, unworkable principle
which courts no longer apply.29
Courts have also relied on the doctrine of consideration to include
"permanent" contracts within the scope of the employment-at-will
rule.3" They reasoned that an employee's wages compensated him for
U.S. 1 (1915) (the Court struck down a Kansas Law that outlawed yellow dog contracts
that required employees to agree not to join a union as a condition of employment).
These opinions mark the height of the Court's insistence on laissez-faire principles in
the labor area. Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1826 (1980).
24. 208 U.S. at 176.
25. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court held that the provisions in the National Labor
Relations Act prohibiting an employer from intimidating or dismissing an employee for
union activity did not unconstitutionally interfere with an employer's freedom of
contract.
26. Id.
27. See Pitcher v. United Oil and Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760,
761 (1932).
28. See, e.g., Rape v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585 (1924).
29. J. CALAMARI & J. PERRILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-14 (2d ed. 1977); 1
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152; J. MURRY, CONTRACTS § 90 (rev. ed. 1974); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981).
30. Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 902 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Sauter v.
Walnut Grove Products, 188 N.W.2d 305, 322 (Iowa 1971); Hanson v. Central Show
Printing Co., 256 Iowa 1221, 130 N.W.2d 654, 657 (1964); Forrer v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 393, 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1967).
However, contemporary courts wishing to mitigate the harshness of the rule that a
contract for permanent employment or employment for life is "an indefinite hiring ter-
1988]
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all of his services and therefore required independent or additional con-
sideration on the part of the employee to support a limitation on the
employer's power to fire.3 1 Such independent consideration may take
the form of relocating,32 sacrificing another job,3 3 or selling the em-
minable at the will of either party," Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273
N.W. 315 (1837), have said that the rule is merely a rule of construction. Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885, reh'g denied,
409 Mich. 1101 (1980).
31. This reasoning was used by the employer in Toussaint.
In Forrer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967), the
plaintiff returned to work after retirement. In exchange for giving up a farm he had
purchased, he was promised permanent employment. Shortly after returning to work,
he was fired. The plaintiff sued, claiming there was a contract for permanent employ-
ment. Although the court indicated that the plaintiff could have recovered if he had
shown additional consideration, it said:
We do not deem that the detriment to the plaintiff herein in giving up his farming
operations at a loss constituted such additional consideration .... A permanent
employment contract is terminable at will unless there is additional consideration
in the form of an economic or financial benefit to the employer. A mere detriment
to the employee is not enough.
Id. at 394, 153 N.W.2d at 590. See also Wright v. C.S. Graves Land Co., 100 Wis. 269,
75 N.W. 1000 (1898).
It is often impossible for an employee to establish the necessary additional considera-
tion. In Odum v. Bush, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S.E. 1011 (1906), a coffin maker was induced to
leave his employment of 25 years to work for a competitor who wanted to establish a
business in another town. After accepting the new employment, the coffin maker sold
his residence and shares of stock he owned in his old employer and moved to the new
town. He was fired soon thereafter. He sued for damages, claiming that his discharge
without just cause breached his employment contract. The court held that the addi-
tional consideration supplied by the coffin maker was ineffective since the contract was
too indefinite to be enforced.
An executory contract of service for no fixed period of time is obviously too indefi-
nite to be capable of enforcement: an offer or employment at so much per month
will in the absence of anything further indicating the period of employment, be
treated as meaning employment for a term of one month.
Id. at 189, 53 S.E. at 1015.
32. See, e.g., Topper v. York Gazette Co., 66 Pa. D & C 3d 337 (York County Ct.
C.P. 1974). Contra Walker v. Modem Realty of Mo., Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir.
1982).
33. See, e.g., Riefkin v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 290 F. 286 (D.C. Cir.
1923); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Products, 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971); Rogozinaki v.
Airstream by Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 377 A.2d 807 (1977). Contra Moody v.
Bogue, 310 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa App. 1981); Edwards v. Kentucky Util. Co., 286 Ky.
341, 150 S.W.2d 916 (1941). Some courts hold that giving up another job is sufficient
consideration only if the employer knew about it. See, e.g., Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d
791 (Ala. 1982); Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
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ployee's business to the employer.3 4 By the mid-twentieth century the
employment-at-will rule applied to over seventy million employees,
although several factors curtailed it. First, federal, state, or local gov-
ernments, which employ approximately sixteen (16) percent 35 of the
workforce, have civil service systems which normally require good
cause for dismissal.36 Second, collective bargaining agreements, which
generally impose a just cause standard for dismissal, protect most
union members from the at-will rule.37 Finally, numerous federal,
state, and local laws which limit an employer's common law right to
fire an employee at will mitigate the harshness of the rule. Among
some of the best known federal laws are the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act,3 8 Occupational Safety & Health Act,39 Age Discrimination
in Employment Act,' Employee Retirement Income Security Act,4 1
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 State and local laws curtailing the
rule include civil rights laws,4 3 state labor laws," workmen's compen-
34. See, e.g., Stauter v. Walnut Grove Products, 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971);
Dutch Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher, 58 Wyo. 374, 131 P.2d 630 (1943).
35. Seesupra note 14. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statisti-
cal Abstract of the United States, 1986, Table 662 at 393 (total labor force); id. Table 692
at 410 (non-agricultural establishments).
36. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a), (b) (1982) (per-
mits removal of federal civil service employees "only for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service.").
37. See note 24, supra. Cf Jones v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 72
N.M. 322, 383 P.2d 571 (1963).
38. ("LMRA"), § 8(a)(1), (3), (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (4) (1975) (prohibits
discharge for union activity, protected concerted activity, or filing charges or giving
testimony under the Act).
39. ("OSHA"), 29 U.S.C. § 60(c) (1975) (prohibits retaliatory discharge of employ-
ees for exercising rights under the Act).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a) (1975 & Supp. 1982) (prohibits discharge because
of age by private employers and federal government of persons over 40 and retaliation
for exercising statutory rights).
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1975) (prohibits termination of employees to prevent
them from receiving vested pension rights).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3(a) (1981) (prohibits discharge based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and retaliation for exercising rights under Title
VII).
43. See, e.g., New York: Human Rights Law, N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(a)(1) & (3)
(McKinney 1980) (prohibits termination because of race, color, religion, national origin,
or sex, or handicap; or because person has opposed practices made illegal by or filed a
complaint, testified, or assisted in proceedings under the statute). California: Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a) & (e) (West 1971 & Supp.
1988]
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sation laws,4 5 laws prohibiting the discharge of employees who serve
on juries, 4 6 and, of course, the rare state and local laws prohibiting the
discharge of employees because of their sexual orientation.47
B. The Development of a Cause of Action for Unjust Dismissal
In 1959 the California Supreme Court in Peterman v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters48 held that public policy considerations such
as that prohibiting the suborning of perjury could limit an employer's
right to fire an employee. In 1967 Professor Lawrence Blades argued
in a seminal law review article that abusively discharged employees
should have a tort cause of action.4 9 By the 1980's many jurisdictions
recognized a cause of action for wrongful termination or unjust dismis-
sal. A few jurisdictions, however, steadfastly clung to the old rule.5 1
The theoretical basis for the emerging law of unjust dismissal has
been inconsistent at times. Generally, however, new causes of action
1975). Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(1)(d) (West Stat. Ann. § 1ll.36(l)(d)
West Supp. § 1983) (prohibits discharge because of sexual orientation).
44. See, e.g., New York: New York State Labor Relations Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 704(2), (5), (8) (10) (McKinney 1977) (private sector). California: State Employer-
Employee Relations Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3519(a) (West 1980) (public sector).
45. See, eg., New York: Workers' Compensation Law, N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW
120 (McKinney Supp. 1981). California: Workers' Compensation and Insurance Act,
CAL. LAB. CODE 132a (West 1971).
46. See, e.g., New York: Judiciary Law, N.Y. JUDIc. LAW § 532 (McKinney 1968)
(prohibits discharge of employees for serving as jurors). California: CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 230 (West 1971).
47. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 6-2221 (West. Supp. 1978-79); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.32, 111.36 & 111.37 (West Supp. 1983-84).
48. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). The California District Court of
Appeals held that an employee fired for refusing to pejure himself in violation of the
criminal law and at his employer's request had a cause of action against his employer
for wrongful discharge because the public policy of California is to discourage all hin-
drances to truthful testimony.
49. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COL. L. REV. 1404 (1967). Professor Blades believed
that punitive damages, which are recoverable in tort actions, would deter employer
abuses. Id. at 1427.
50. For a compilation of the status of the employment-at-will rule in the 50 states
and Puerto Rico, see L. LARSEN, UNJusT DIsMISSAL, ch. 10 (1985). Among those
states recognizing exceptions to the rule are: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.
51. See note 3 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/3
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
or "exceptions to the rule" arise from public policy, contract law, or
tort law. The public policy and contract causes of action are the most
widespread and coherent of the three.
The remainder of this Article examines the three exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule and discusses the potential relief each offers a
wrongfully discharged homosexual employee. The author concludes
that both the contract and public policy exceptions strongly support
the existence of a cause of action. Recovery on a tort theory is less
likely.
III. THE CONTRACT EXCEPTION: Is THERE A JUST CAUSE
STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL?
By arguing that a just cause standard for discharge is implicit in all
employment contracts, advocates of employment security for homosex-
uals can find success with the contract exception to the employment-at-
will rule. Consequently, summary dismissal of a homosexual would be
unlawful because an employee's sexual orientation fails to constitute
cause for discharge. No case concerning the discharge of a homosexual
by a private employer has unequivocally accepted this argument.
There is, however, a trend in favor of this position. 2 It is now possible
to make two intermediate arguments that will strengthen job security
for many homosexuals. First, an employment-at-will contract coupled
with additional factors, such as an employee's longevity on the job5 3 or
an employer's promise of fair treatment,54 should be sufficient to re-
quire just cause for discharge. Second, in order for homosexuality to
constitute just cause for discharge, an employer must show that an em-
ployee's homosexuality adversely affects his job performance.
The contract exception evolved as a means to defeat the presumption
under the at-will rule that by failing to agree to a definite term the
parties intended to provide for at-will termination by the employer or
the employee. Courts infer the existence of a contract not by the exist-
ence of written words, but by implication and deduction from the cir-
52. See Blades, note 49 supra, at 1421-1427.
53. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10 at 10 (Hombook
ed. 1970). See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
361-62 (1974).
54. Comunale v. Trader's Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
See Bliss v. Hoyt, 70 Vt. 534, 41 A. 1026 (1898); Kellum v. Broivisg's Adm'r, 231 Ky.
308, 24 S.W.2d 459, 465 (1929). See, e.g., Brawthen v. H & R. Block, Inc., 28 Cal. App.
3d 131, 104 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1st Dist. 1972).
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cumstances surrounding the transaction or by the conduct of the
parties. There are two types of implied contracts: implied-in-fact and
implied-in-law. Both potentially obligate the employer to refrain from
firing an employee without just cause. Despite the language of implied
contracts, the basic employment contract between parties remains a
bilateral agreement. The implied agreement is only part of that con-
tract and is a means to avoid the presumption of at-will hiring.
A. Implied-in-law Contracts
An implied-in-law contract, also known as a constructive or quasi-
contract, is an obligation imposed by law in the interest of fairness de-
spite the absence of a promise or the intent to make one. The terms of
implied-in-law contracts depend on the court's conception of what the
agreement between the parties should have been.
1. Implied Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing (CGF & FD)
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (CGF & FD)
creates an obligation on both parties to avoid acts which impair the
other party's right to receive the benefit of the contract. Despite the
covenant's origin in the insurance field, Congress codified the covenant
in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as an element of all com-
mercial contracts. 5
Although employment contracts are not regulated by the U.C.C.,
they are commercial in nature and should contain the CGF & FD.
Some courts have adopted such a proposal. In Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. the California Supreme Court held that the covenant ex-
isted in employment contracts,56 and in Cleary v. American Airlines,
the California Court of Appeals held that an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing exists in every contract.5 7 Because of the similar-
ity between insurance contracts and employment contracts, this result
55. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203. The section provides, "Every contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment." See generally Summers, infra note 59.
56. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172-174, 610 P.2d 1330, 1332-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-43
(1980). Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations on the Right to Discharge: A Cali-
fornia Trilogy, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 65, 67-83 (1982); Note, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.: Wrongful Discharge, a New Tort to Protect At-Will Employees, 18 W. ST. U.L.
REv. 91 (1980). For a discussion of Tameny see notes 77-82 and accompanying text
infra.
57. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 711, 728 (2nd Dist. 1980); Miller &
Estes, supra note 56 at 83-95.
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seems justified."8 Both contracts deal in security, well-being, and peace
of mind. Moreover, insurance companies and employers control access
to relationships crucial to survival in modern society. Both have great
power over the parties with whom they contract-often to the point of
adhesion. Finally, if either party acts in bad faith, the consequences for
society can be serious.
Other attributes of the employment contract justify application of
the CGF & FD. First, the employment relationship is more of a status
relationship than a contractual one. Second, the disparity of power
between the employer and the employee and the ambiguous nature of
the typical oral employment contract leave the employee subject to em-
ployer abuse. Third, most employment contracts are not the result of
free bargaining between parties; arguably, many are contracts of adhe-
sion. Moreover, the rights arising from most employment-at-will
agreements are less than the reasonable expectations of employees. No
reasonable employee would grant an employer the right to fire him for
an arbitrary or capricious reason.59 The CGF & FD gives the em-
ployee legitimate relational expectancies, including freedom from
abuse, pension rights, and limits on reemployability owing to employ-
ment longevity.' Finally, the typical employee is a weaker party, de-
pendant on the good will of the employer for the necessities of life.
Some commentators have therefore asserted that the relationship be-
tween them is fiduciary. 6 '
2. What Constitutes a Breach of the Covenant?
No court has definitively held that an employer breaches the CGF &
FD when he fires an employee without just cause, but convincing argu-
ments supporting that proposition do exist. In Cleary v. American Air-
58. Miller & Estes, supra note 56, at 83-95.
59. See Summers, 'Good Faith' in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 201, 251 n.222 (1968) ("a party presum-
ably agrees merely to the grant of a power, and not also to the grant of a power to abuse
a power").
60. These relational expectancies have also been called "employee equities," "valua-
ble rights," or "new property." See, e.g., E. GINZBERG & I. BERG, DEMOCRATIC VAL-
UES AND THE RIGHTS OF MANAGEMENT 172-89 (1963); F. MEYERS, OWNERSHIP OF
JOBS; A COMPARATIVE STUDY 15-16 (1964).
61. Comment, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: A Common Ground
For the Torts of Wrongful Discharge from Employment, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1111
(1980). See Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 751, 177 P.2d 931, 943 (1947) (quoting
Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933);
Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App. 2d 357, 372, 305 P.2d 669, 678 (1956).
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lines,62 the employer discharged the plaintiff after 18 years of service,
allegedly for union activity. The plaintiff claimed that the discharge
was without cause and that company regulations providing fair, impar-
tial, and objective procedures for reviewing employee grievances pro-
tected him. The California Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court's
summary dismissal, acknowledged that the implied CGF & FD applied
to the employment contract. The appellate court held that the longev-
ity of plaintiff's service, together with the expressed policy of the em-
ployer precluded discharge of such an employee without just cause.63
By requiring the employee to show additional factors to achieve just-
cause protection, the court stopped short of holding that a discharge
without just cause violates the CGF & FD. In other words, discharged
homosexuals, like the plaintiff in Cleary, would have to prove longevity
of service and some kind of commitment to fair treatment on the part
of the employer.
Although the Cleary rule grants significant protection in California,
it is theoretically inconsistent. If a covenant is implied by law, it is
difficult to understand why courts should apply it on the basis of lon-
gevity. By firing an employee of only five years service, the employer
would still violate the principle of good faith and fair dealing. Indeed,
so long as an employer had sufficient time to accurately assess the em-
ployee's job performance, a capricious summary dismissal is unfair re-
gardless of length of service. Moreover, the second prong of Cleary-
that an employer's policy creates a just-cause standard-erroneously
incorporates the action and intent of the parties, which is normally the
domain of an implied-in-fact contract.
Other problems exist with the additional factors required to trigger
just-cause protection. First, with respect to longevity, the determina-
tion of the necessary time span is subjective and will result in more
litigation than the more objective just-cause standard. Second, the em-
ployer policy requirement in Cleary is equally confusing. Unless the
policy was less concrete and less vigorous than the employer conduct
required to give rise to an implied-in-fact contract, the CGF & FD
would be superfluous.
Of the other standards advanced for determining a breach of the
covenant, the good faith standard is the most common. Although it is
difficult to distinguish good faith from just cause, the good faith deter-
62. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
63. Id. 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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mination made by reference to an employer's motive is a less stringent
standard than just cause." If an employer acts in good faith, just cause
is probably unnecessary.61 In a general sense, "good faith" denotes
honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and adherence
to one's obligation. 66 Some have advocated a business judgment rule,
which precludes review of the legitimacy of an employer's business rea-
sons for discharging an employee if the employer shows that he exer-
cised honest judgment. 67 A third possible standard is the proposition
that the covenant is breached only when the employer's conduct is ma-
licious or shocking.
68
Clearly, if courts hold that an employer breaches the CGF & FD
whenever he fires an employee without cause, they would avoid making
subjective rulings regarding employer's intent and whether the longev-
ity of employment merits just cause protection. Furthermore, courts
could use the rules governing the discharge of public employees and
the law of arbitration to articulate a fair and practical definition of just
cause.69 Although opponents to employment security for homosexuals
predict that modification of the employment-at-will rule would result
in a flood of litigation from discharged employees, their fears have yet
to materialize. Under the Cleary test and the good-faith standard,
however, more litigation is likely to result than under a just-cause stan-
dard. Both terms are indefinite, imprecise, and subjective. Good faith,
however, is more problematic because it depends on motive, which is
notoriously difficult to prove.
Motive is less important under a just-cause standard. The just-cause
standard readily lends itself to the McDonnell Douglas v. Green70 allo-
cation of proof used in employment discrimination cases.71 Under this
64. See Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1840 (1980).
65. See Wanee v. Board of Directors, 56 Cal. App. 3d 644, 128 Cal. Rptr. 526
(1976).
66. Efron v. Kalmanovetz, 249 Cal. App. 187, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (1977).
67. See Crozier v. United Parcel Service Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1139, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 366 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1983).
68. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145, 355 N.E.2d 315, 319
(1976) ("extreme and outrageous" conduct by an employer in terminating an employee
could create a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
69. For a discussion of homosexuality as just cause for termination of an employee,
see text accompanying notes 131-159 infra.
70. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
71. This allocation of proof is used to prove that a plaintiff was subject to disparate
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standard, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing that the
employer discriminated against him. If the plaintiff satisfies this initial
burden, the employer must then provide a business justification or
other defense for his action. Finally, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant's explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination.
In the present context, the plaintiff would first demonstrate a prima
facie case of wrongful termination which violated his employment con-
tract. The burden of proof shifts to the employer, who must provide
evidence as to the reason for the termination. The employee could
then attack the offered explanation, either on the ground that it is
pretextual or on the ground that it is insufficient to meet the employer's
obligations under contract principles.72 Notably, the plaintiff must
prove that the employer wrongfully terminated him.73 This tripartite
allocation facilitates a response to the motivation question, which is
relevant only to the third step. At this final step, the plaintiff may use
the employer's actions as indicia of motive. Under the good-faith stan-
dard, it would be more difficult to infer motive because the action of
the employer is irrelevant. For example, in the case of an employee
fired because of homosexuality, a court applying the just-cause stan-
dard would be concerned with whether the employee's homosexuality
made it impossible for him to perform his job. Under the good-faith
standard, however, the court's concern would be whether the em-
ployer's prejudice against homosexuals was in good faith and uni-
formly applied throughout the business. The first element of that
concern is highly subjective and difficult to prove.
The just-cause standard is also more flexible than the alternatives.
treatment. For discrimination based on the adverse impact of a neutral selection device
such as an employment test, a slightly different allocation is used. The plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case that the selection device in question has an adverse
impact on a protected class. If he does, the burden shifts to the employer to show that
the selection device is job related. If the employer succeeds, the plaintiff can then at-
tempt to show that the device is not truly job-related because another selection device
would perform the same business function as the first while having less adverse impact.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW at 13-22, 82-92 (1983) (student edition).
72. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329-330, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
927 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980).
73. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329-330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927; Cleary, 111 Cal. App.
3d at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); cf McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-807 (1973).
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Good faith is an absolute concept which is constant regardless of the
nature of the job or the characteristics of the employee. Just cause for
termination, however, can vary from case to case, depending on the
nature of the job, the nature of the industry, and the length of service.
Since successful job performance often depends on personality, the
confidence of higher management, and subjective evaluations, the con-
cept of just cause of discharge allows management to consider these
factors.7 4 Another factor in favor of the just-cause standard is that the
law of labor arbitration, which has refined the concept of just cause for
termination, 7 would be available for guidance.
The final and most convincing argument in favor of a just-cause
standard lies in its fairness. The other standards in varying degrees
overlook the plight of the dismissed individual. To such a person, the
employer's motive or other wrongful conduct is irrelevant. It is signifi-
cant that unions, which represent individual employees, have made just
cause protection a major point of their negotiations and have adver-
tised it as a benefit of unionization.76
Employers have argued strenuously against the abolition of the at-
will rule in general and the contract exceptions in particular. No gay
activist has argued that an employee should be retained when eco-
nomic conditions do not justify his employment, or when he cannot
perform the job. Even the most progressive arguments maintain only
that an employer should have a valid reason for firing an employee.
Since no employer would want his clients to know him as arbitrary,
unfair, or capricious, these arguments are reasonable. The resistance
to a just-cause standard seems both detrimental economically and
hypocritical.
74. See Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928 (1981).
75, See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS Ch. 15 (1985). See gen-
erally M. GOLLUB, DISCHARGE FOR CAUSE (1948); Holly, "The Arbitration of Dis-
charge Cases: A Case Study," in CRITICAL ISSUES IN LABOR ARBITRATION 1 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1957); Note, Discharge in the 'Law' or Arbitration, 20 VAND. L. REV. 81
(1966). For a discussion how arbitrators have handled the issue of whether homosexu-
ality constitutes just cause for discharge, see text accompanying notes 149-159 infra.
76. See Blades, supra note 49 at 1410. See 2 Collective Bargaining Negotiations &
Contracts (BNA) 40:1 (1979). However, only 18 percent of American workers are un-
ionized, note 14 supra and accompanying text, and approximately 67 percent are with-
out any kind of just cause protection. Id. Arguably, unions are hostile to the
developing law of unjust dismissal because it removes one of the major incentives for
unionization.
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3. Tort or Contract?
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., which involved the termina-
tion of an employee who refused to engage in an illegal price-fixing
scheme, the California Supreme Court held that the employee had a
cause of action based on the public policy exception both in contract
and in tort.7 8 By including both causes of action as in the Cleary con-
tract exception situation,79 a party can expand his remedies and obtain
the most favorable statute of limitations.80 Courts limit contractual
damages to compensatory damages, which normally include only back
pay.8" In a tort action, however, an employee can recover all damages
proximately caused by the discharge, including punitive damages."
This distinction may explain the employer resistance to the just-cause
standard. If a violation of the CGF & FD sounded only in contract,
the damages in most cases would be smaller and the employer's resist-
ance to the just-cause standard weaker. Advocates of homosexual
rights should employ this approach because their proper concern
should be to obtain job security for the greatest number of persons,
rather than to recover large sums for isolated instances of unjust
discrimination.
This approach has been adopted in the public policy context by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet83
the court held that the public policy exception should sound exclu-
sively in contract, even though most jurisdictions enforce the public
policy exception in tort. The court justified its holding as follows:
We believe that reinstatement and backpay are the most appropri-
ate remedies for public policy exception wrongful discharges since
the primary concern in these actions is to make the wronged em-
ployee whole. Therefore, we conclude that a contract action is
most appropriate for wrongful discharges... Tort actions cannot
77. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
78. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 175.
79. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (2nd Dist. 1980).
80. See L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 3.02 (1985).
81. See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 181-92, 474
P.2d 689, 692, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740 (1970); Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Industries, Inc.,
55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 98, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222-226 (1976).
82. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980).
83. 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
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be maintained. 4
The advantage of the Brockmeyer approach is that it would provide at-
will employees with protection similar to that which union members
enjoy. When an employer fires a worker covered by the just-cause pro-
vision of a collective bargaining contract without cause, the employee
can through arbitration recover only reinstatement and backpay.85
Since one of the main arguments in favor of mitigating the employ-
ment-at-will rule has been to equalize the treatment of union and non-
union workers, it makes little sense to provide the latter with greater
protection.
B. Implied-in-Fact Contracts
Courts infer implied-in-fact contracts from the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction, including the acts and conduct of the par-
ties. 6 They find that in the interests of justice, it is reasonable, or even
necessary, to assume that a contract exists between the parties. In the
employment-at-will context, courts use the implied-in-fact contract
theory to create exceptions to the rule in a number of areas. Two rec-
ognized exceptions important to the topic of this article are contracts
created by oral representations87 and those created by collateral writ-
ten policies and representations such as personnel handbooks.88 Such
implied contracts usually contain "terms" requiring just cause for ter-
mination. Another limitation commonly implied requires the em-
ployer to follow a specific procedure in terminating an employee. As
with the implied CGF & FD, any implied contract creating a promise
to discharge only for cause will protect homosexuals from unjust
discrimination.
84. Id. at 840.
85. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 688 (1985).
86. See Power Matics Inc. v. Ligotti, 79 N.J. Super. 294, 191 A.2d 483, 489 (1963);
3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 561-72A (1960); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 10-12 (3d ed.
1979).
87. See. e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (1980) (employer stated that termination would be pursuant to a specific
procedure).
88. See, e.g., Reid v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986). See L.
LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 3.04[3][c ] and [d] (1985). Strictly speaking, the "excep-
tion" based on personnel handbooks are not exceptions at all. In requiring just cause in
such cases the courts are not creating an exception to the employment at will rule, but
establishing the terms and conditions of an employment contract on the basis of the
representations of the parties and the particular facts of the case.
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1. Implied Promise of Job Security
In Pugh v. See's Candies,89 the employer fired the plaintiff, a corpo-
rate vice president, after thirty years of service, allegedly for opposing
the company's sweetheart contract with a union.90 Refusing to accept
the plaintiff's argument that the company agreed to employ him as
long as his performance was satisfactory, the trial court directed a ver-
dict for the employer. Reversing the trial court, yet refusing to follow
Cleary, the California Court of Appeals held that the parties impliedly
agreed that good cause would be required for termination. The indicia
of the implied contract included: (1) the longevity of the plaintiff's
service; (2) the routine raises, bonuses, and promotions the plaintiff re-
ceived; (3) the assurance of the prior president that the plaintiff's em-
ployment would continue if he did a good job; (4) the company's
acknowledged practice of terminating executive personnel only for
cause; (5) the fact that the employer never criticized the plaintiff nor
warned him that his job was in jeopardy, and (6) the practices of the
industry in which the employer was engaged.91 The totality of these
circumstances created the employer's implied promise to refrain from
arbitrarily terminating an employee.
Despite the theoretical difference, the Pugh case is similar in result to
Cleary. Both cases require cause for discharge and both hold that the
just-cause standard is not inherent in the fact of holding the job. The
employee must establish just cause by additional factors such as lon-
gevity or the employer's normal policy. The Pugh court expanded the
factors with which an employee could establish a just-cause promise,
In addition to longevity and employer policy, the court was willing to
evaluate all the circumstances of the employment relation including
promotions, lack of criticism and the practice of the industry. Thus, it
should be easier to prove the existence of an implied-in-fact contract
than an implied-in-law one, and courts will grant summary dismissals
only if the evidence supporting the implied contract is meager. 92
Recent developments suggest that courts will be receptive to the
Pugh implied-in-fact contract because it adheres to traditional contract
law. 93 First, courts must accept the widely held belief that the addi-
89. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ist Dist. 1981).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 326-327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-926.
92. Miller and Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations On the Right to Discharge: A Cali-
fornia Trilogy, 16 U.C.D.L. REv. 65, 99 (1982).
93. Id. at 100.
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tional consideration requirement for so-called "permanent" employ-
ment is a rule of construction, rather than a substantive limitation on
the formation of employment contracts. Second, courts must reject the
discredited mutuality of obligation principle. The Pugh approach is
more consistent with current legal thought, which considers the cir-
cumstances surrounding a legal relationship to establish and modify
the rules by which it is regulated. Examining the totality of an employ-
ment relationship to determine if there is an implied promise to fire
only for cause is within this disposition. In the commercial context,
this is known as gap-filling and permits the implication of reasonable
terms.
9 4
Numerous courts using the Pugh approach have held that an em-
ployer implicitly promised to fire an employee only if his performance
was unsatisfactory.95 Recruiters, interviewers, personnel representa-
tives, or other members of management9 6 each have the capacity to
make implied promises, so long as they appear to have authority to
make it. For example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, a statement by an interviewer that the prospective employee
"would be with the company as long as [he] did [his] job," implied that
the company would fire the employee only for just cause.9 7 Another
court found a statement by the personnel department that the em-
ployer fired employees only for cause to be an implied promise that the
employer would not fire the plaintiff arbitrarily.98
The major benefit of both Pugh and Cleary for homosexual employ-
94. Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty
to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1833 (1980).
95. See, eg., Wiskotoni v. Michigan National Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1983) (statement in manual that probationary employees could be fired at will implied
that nonprobationary employees could only be terminated for cause); Eales v. Tanana
Valley Medical Surgical Group, Inc., 633 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Rabago-Alvarez v.
Dart Industries, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976) (implied promise
that an employee would not be fired without good cause created by employer's represen-
tation that it only fired employees for cause); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (interviewer's statement that an em-
ployee would not be fired as long as he did his job implied that just cause was required
for termination of employee); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 576 P.2d
356 (Or. 1978).
96 E.g., Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Industries, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 222 (1976) (personnel representative); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (interviewer).
97. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 585, 292 N.W.2d at 886.
98. Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., 55 Cal. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976).
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ees lies in their implication of a just-cause standard for termination. If
the employee establishes the standard by either rationale, then a dis-
charged homosexual can argue that the employer fired him without
cause. Typically, the employee will argue that his homosexuality did
not prevent him from satisfactorily performing his job. Although this
argument will not always succeed, it gives homosexuals a better chance
for job security than exists under the employment-at-will rule.
Pugh offers an unjustly discharged homosexual additional argu-
ments. Between 1976 and 1981 the National Gay Task Force (NGTF)
conducted a survey of Fortune 500 companies to ascertain the extent of
sexual orientation discrimination. 99 Revealing that there were indeed
major companies which claim not to discriminate, the results were well
publicized, especially in the gay community. Did the employers who
claimed not to discriminate also make an implied promise not to fire
employees because of their sexual orientation. The implied-in-fact the-
ory outlined above applies to this situation, the main issue being
whether a discharged gay employee was aware of the employer's policy
of non-discrimination at the time the company hired him. Certainly
representatives with authority to bind the responding corporations an-
swered the NGTF survey. Moreover, it would seem unfair to allow the
employers to benefit from the reputation as being unbiased, and then to
allow them to discriminate with impunity. This is the situation that
courts tailored the doctrine of implied contracts to prevent.
An employer's commitment not to discriminate against homosexuals
may also support a remedy based on promissory estoppel."°° Under
the promissory estoppel doctrine, a homosexual employee fired because
99. NGTF Survey is on file with author.
100. This argument was originally developed in Note, Challenging Sexual Prefer-
ence Discrimination in Private Employment, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 526 (1980). Cases
applying the doctrine in the employment context are based on the idea that an employer
should not be allowed to ignore a promise to an employee if the employee reasonably
relied on it to his detriment. See Rawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D.
Col. 1982); Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d 791 (Ala. 1982); Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198
(Alaska 1983); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 2d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998
(1982); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Nilsson v.
Cherokee Candy & Tobacco Co., 639 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1982). But see Walker v. Mod-
em Realty of Missouri, 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982); Bates v. Jim Waters Resources,
Inc., 418 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1982).
Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts defines promissory estoppel as:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/3
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
of sexual preference after relying on an employer's statement of non-
discrimination in the NGTF survey should have a basis for recovery.
Such an employee would argue that the employer's policy of impartial-
ity encouraged him to reveal his sexual orientation or to support gay
rights openly. Because of this reliance, he lost his job. Although this
argument appears theoretically attractive, it is impractical. Courts
have used the promissory estoppel theory primarily to enforce a prom-
ise of initial employment. 1 1 When employees have attempted to en-
force a promise of job security under the theory of promissory estoppel,
courts have not been receptive.' 0 2
Similar arguments were raised unsuccessfully in Satori v. Society of
American Military Engineers."°3 The Society, Satori's employer for
eight years, stated in its bylaws that it would terminate employees only
for cause and that homosexuality was not cause for discharge."°4 Be-
lieving that his employer had impliedly agreed not to fire him because
of his sexual orientation, Satori spoke about gay politics with a journal-
ist and other men. After being identified in a newspaper article as a
gay man working for the Society, the Society fired him. Satori sued
alleging unjust dismissal in tort and contract, estoppel, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, and defamation."5 After initially deny-
ing the existence of the bylaw provision, the Society in a motion for
summary judgment argued that "the representation does not raise to a
high enough level, as a matter of law, to rebut the presumption that the
employment ... was terminable at will."' 10 6 Judge Grenadier of the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932), slightly modified in RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
101. Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Cal. App. 1975); Grouse v. Group Health
Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). See L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL
§ 3.04[l] (1986).
102. L. LARSEN, supra note 101.
103. No. 9008 (Cir. Ct. Alexandria, Va. June 6, 1984). Satori is discussed at length
in Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part I, 10 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 459, 475-476 (1985).
104. The bylaws provide:
Nondiscrimination Policy: The Society fully supports the policy of equal opportu-
nity and will not discriminate or knowingly participate in any activity that discrim-
inates on the bases or [sic] race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, or national
origin. Likewise, The Society will take no official action which is or appears to be
detrimental or discriminatory to any class or group of persons.
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Satori, No. 9008 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id.
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
96 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 33:73
Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria in a conclusory order granted
the employer's motion.10 7
Other circumstances can establish an implied promise not to fire em-
ployees for sexual preference. For instance, the employee could imply
from the length of his employment the employer's promise not to en-
gage in sexual preference discrimination. If a gay employee worked for
an employer for a number of years, and the employer was aware of his
sexual orientation, the employee could infer such a promise based on
the employer's failure to terminate him immediately upon discovering
his homosexuality. By failing to act immediately, the employer waived
his right to do so later. The reasoning behind this longevity argument
is the same used in Cleary and Pugh, to imply a just-cause requirement
for discharge. 108
Obviously, the arguments advanced so far present problems of proof
and are germane largely in industries where the least discrimination
exists. Problems of proof exist, however, because of the significance of
past discrimination, and the novelty of the arguments is not the liti-
gant's theory, but the context in which he expressed it. These argu-
ments are, in most cases, formal articulations of unwritten rules. And
because these rules are unwritten, the potential for individual abuse
exists even in normally tolerant environments.
2. Personnel Handbooks and Other Written Policies
Often expressed in a personnel manual or handbook, an employer's
personnel policies and practices may create a contract even though the
employer retains the right to change or repeal its policies at any
time.'0 9 Normally, the contract results from a policy statement in a
107. Order, Satori, No. 9008. Professor Rivera notes that the dismissal will be ap-
pealed. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part 1, 10 U.
DAYTON L. Rlv. 459, 476 (1985).
108. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1st
Dist. 1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 729 (2d Dist. 1980). For a discussion of longevity as a factor in creating an
exception to the employment at will rule, see Heshizer, The Implied Contract Exception
ToAt- WillEmployment, 35 LAB. L.J. 131, 133-134 (1984). But see Halsell v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1982); Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Runar v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 560 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
109. Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1978); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983); Weiner v. Mc-
Graw Hill Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982). See also Wiskotoni v. Michigan
National Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Pine River State Bank v. Mettile,
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handbook that an employer will discharge only for cause. Theoreti-
cally, it is difficult to place contracts based on handbooks within the
emerging law of unjust dismissal. In one sense, they are not exceptions
to the employment-at-will rule because they create express contracts,
which may not contain a definite duration.l° The theoretical distinc-
tion is of little consequence for this paper, and the author treats con-
tracts as implied-in-fact exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.
Courts have adopted an ad hoc approach to determine whether a
personnel manual is part of an employment contract.111 The issue in
each case is whether a reasonable person, examining the policies the
employer delineated in the manual, would conclude that the employer
intended to include a just-cause standard in the employment agree-
ment. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan112 the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that the provisions in a voluntarily
adopted personnel manual, distributed to employees at or after hiring,
and providing that discharge will only be for cause, may become part
of the employment contract.
In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 3 the New York Court of Appeals,
which previously resisted all other exceptions to the employment-at-
will rule, held that a statement in a personnel manual created a binding
333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 576 P.2d
356 (Or. 1978); Reid v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Chamber-
lain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
110. L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL §§ 3.01, 8.01 (1985).
111. See generally Pine River State Bank v. Mettile, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983);
Morms v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983).
112. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, reh'g denied, 409 Mich. 1101 (1980). In
Toussaint the plaintiff claimed that the company's personnel manual and oral represen-
tations made by an employment interviewer created a contract requiring just cause for
discharge. The manual provided that the company would "treat employees leaving
Blue Cross in a fair and consistent manner and ... release employees for just cause
only," id. at 597-98, 292 N.W.2d at 884, and specified certain procedures to be followed
in the event of a discharge. In addition, the interviewer told the plaintiff in his job
interview that he would be employed as long as he did his job. Id.
113. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). In Weiner the em-
ployment application signed by Weiner and company representatives stated that his
employment was subject to the company handbook which required just cause for dis-
charge and specified termination procedures. Also, he was told that he would have job
security as an inducement for him to leave his former employer to work for McGraw-
Hill. During his tenure, Weiner was instructed to fire subordinates only for cause and
in strict accordance with the procedures required by the handbook. Moreover, he was
told that failure to do so might subject the employer to liability. After eight years of
satisfactory job performance, Weiner was suddenly fired for "lack of application" and
without the rehabilitative efforts required by the handbook.
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contrdct. The manual provided that the employer would discharge
only for just and sufficient cause and only after the company failed to
take all practical steps toward rehabilitation of the employee. This lan-
guage, the court held, created a binding contract under traditional con-
tract law. The necessary additional consideration was found in the
recruitment of the plaintiff from his former employer with the assur-
ance that he would be discharged only for cause. Other courts have
interpreted the additional consideration requirement more liberally,
deeming it a rule of construction rather than rule of substance.1 14
As with other implied promises of job security, homosexual employ-
ees will clearly benefit when a handbook expressly provides that an
employer will only fire for cause or outlines a procedure for all termi-
nations. As is possible with implied contracts,' 15 handbooks and other
policy statements could also contain a promise not to discharge an em-
ployee because of his sexual orientation. For example, employers often
declare themselves to be an equal opportunity employer. Citing such a
statement, a wrongfully discharged homosexual can argue that the em-
ployer promised to be impartial.
Courts can analyze other statements by employers, such as invita-
tions to minorities to apply for particular jobs, as applying to homosex-
uals as well. Of course, the meaning of "equal employment
opportunity" and other terms derive from the connotations they con-
vey to the people using them. If the rights of homosexuals increase in
the future, as they have in the recent past, it is likely that the meaning
of these phrases will change. Consequently, use of these phrases will
strengthen the argument for the existence of an implied contract
against termination on the basis of sexual orientation.
3. The Employer Escape Hatch
Although courts are receptive to the implied-in-fact contract excep-
tion, a serious drawback discourages its widespread acceptance. Since
a handbook is a unilateral statement of company policy, an employer
may change it at any time and reestablish the employment on an at-will
basis. 16 In fact, with the growing awareness of the exception, this ap-
114. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettile, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
115. See supra notes 55-76 for discussion of implied-in-law contracts.
116. Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 613-15, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892, reh'g denied, 409 Mich. 1101 (1980). See also Batchelor v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich.
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pears to be precisely what employers, with court approval, are do-
ing." 7 Many handbooks now include statements which disclaim an
intent to enter into a contract. 1 8
In Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisers," 9 the employer fired the
plaintiff after three and one-half years of service, contrary to indica-
tions in benefit brochures and supervisors' statements that the em-
ployer would terminate workers only for good cause. 120  A stock-
option agreement between the plaintiff and his employer, however, re-
served the employer's right to discharge the employee at any time, with
or without good cause.' 2 ' Applying standard contract law, the court
held that an implied-in-fact contract limiting the employer's right to
terminate cannot exist where the parties expressly agreed that the em-
ployee is terminable at will.
Other courts have used this reasoning,'12  thereby raising major
doubts as to the future utility of the implied-in-fact contract exception.
An incidental effect of these cases is that they discourage employers
from treating employees fairly and consistently. Moreover, they pro-
mote a working environment in which it is clear that all employees
serve at the whim of the employer. Such an unstable work environ-
App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981); Mau v. Omaha National Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299
N,W.2d 147 (1980).
117. The following statement was issued by a company after a dispute over the
meaning of handbook provisions relating to medical insurance disability: "The ***
handbook issued in early 1984 is out-of-date and should not be relied upon for current
policy. The Human Resources Department is presently revising the handbook for dis-
tribution to employees in the fall." (Internal company memo on file with the author).
118. In Novosell v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980), for
example, the employment application provides "my employment and compensation can
be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the
option of either the Company or myself..." The plaintiff had signed the application
and the court held that the personnel manual created no contractual obligation. Accord,
Summers v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 549 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1982). See also
Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. App. 1981).
119. 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Novosell v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Wal-
Noon Corp. v. Hill, 45 Cal. App. 3d 605, 613, 119 Cal. Rptr. 646. See also Crossen v.
Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Crain v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Murphy v. American Home
Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303-05, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y. Supp. 2d 232, 237
(1983).
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ment negatively affects employees and is detrimental to society in
general.
4. Madsen v. Erwin
To date, no court has held that the termination of a homosexual
employee because of his sexual orientation breaches an implied-in-fact
contract. One recent case, however, implies that such a holding is pos-
sible. In Madsen v. Erwin '23 the plaintiff, a writer for the Christian
Science Monitor, was a member of the Christian Science Church. Af-
ter five years of employment during which she received raises and pro-
motions, the employer fired her when she admitted she was a lesbian
and refused to "heal herself of homosexuality."' 24 The employee sued
her employer, claiming that the discharge was a breach of contract' 25
The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims under the state and federal
constitutions, state civil rights laws, and her claims of unjust dismissal
and breach of contract. Noting that publication of the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor was a religious activity of the Christian Science Church,
the court held that granting the requested relief would violate the free
exercise and establishment clauses of the United States Constitution. 26
According to the church, homosexuality is a sin, and by allowing the
plaintiff to collect damages the court would penalize the church for its
religious belief. The implication of the holding is that the court would
uphold a breach of contract claim against a nonreligious employer.' 27
The court cited two cases which also imply that a cause of action
would exist against a secular defendant. In Walker v. First Presbyte-
rian Church '28 the church discharged the plaintiff, a church organist,
after he admitted his homosexuality. The court held that forcing the
defendants to pay damages would substantially burden the free exercise
of their religion. Similarly, in Lewis ex rel. Murphy v. Buchanan 229 a
parochial school withdrew its job offer to the plaintiff upon discovering
123. 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985).
124. Id.
125. Id. Although the exact nature of the contract claim is unclear from the report,
it is reasonable to assume that it was for the breach of an implied-in-fact contract. The
facts conform to the implied-in-fact contract exception to the employment-at-will rule,
and the implied.in-law exception is unavailable in Massachusetts.
126. Id. at 720, 481 N.E.2d at 1165-1166.
127. Id. at 726, 481 N.E.2d at 1170.
128. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980).
129. 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 696 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1979).
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his homosexuality. The plaintiff sued under a municipal ordinance
that prohibited sexual preference discrimination. In refusing to enforce
the municipal ordinance, the judge held that the city's interest in pro-
tecting homosexuals from job discrimination was insufficient to justify
the invasion of an individual's freedom of conscience. 130 Given the
religious context of these three cases, none of them are conclusive au-
thority against the application of the contract exception to the employ-
ment-at-will rule to discharged homosexuals. Indeed, the clear
implication is the opposite.
C. Homosexuality as Just Cause for Termination of Employment
In the employment-at-will context just cause is a flexible standard
that may differ with each job. The terms "just cause" and "good
cause" connote a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good
faith on the part of the party exercising the power."'
130. Id. at 698.
131. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 917-918
(1981). Examples of just cause for discharge include: Stephens v. Justice-Mears Oil
Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 1974) (inability to perform the job); Scarpace v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 608, 335 N.W.2d 844 (1983) (excessive absenteeism); Shaw
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975) (lying); Rozier v. St. Mary's
Hosp., 88 Il. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50 (1980) (insubordination); Johnson v. Na-
tional Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Men-
doza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (impairing company morale). For a
discussion of the concept of just cause, see Abrams & Nolans, Toward A Theory of'Just
Cause' in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594. The authors' developed a
theory of just cause based on three principles. First, the employee's work must be satis-
factory. This term encompasses four components: regular attendance, obedience, rea-
sonable productivity and abstention from conduct that would hinder the employer's
ability to conduct its business. Second, in order for discipline to be just, it must be
based on a legitimate management interest including rehabilitation of an employee, de-
terrence, or protection of the employer's business. Finally, just cause means that disci-
pline must be fair, which includes granting the employee industrial due process,
industrial equal protection and individualized treatment. See generally Jacobwitz v.
United States, 424 F.2d 555 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Kawneer Co., 86-1 ARB 8185 (Dec. 27,
1985); Mastic Corp., 86-1 ARB 8217 (Sept. 9, 1985); L. & N. Uniform Supply Co., 83-
2 ARB c 8605 (Nov. 1I, 1983); Kaiser Steel Corp., 78 L.A. 185 (June 8, 1982); R.J.
Tower Corp., 68 LA 1160 (June 9, 1977); Major Safe Co., Inc., 76-2 ARB 8642 (Dec.
9, 1976); Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 207 (1983); Blades, supra note 49 at 1406; Note, Protecting Private
Employees' Freedom of Political Speech, 18 HARV. J. LEGISL. 35, 63 (1981).
Some states deal with the just cause statutorily. South Dakota, for example, provides:
"An employment even for a specified term may be terminated at any time by the em-
ployer for habitual neglect of duty or continued incapacity to perform or any willful
breach of duty by the employee in the course of his employment." S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 60-4-5 (1978). See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 1984). Just
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Courts have yet to address the issue of whether homosexuality con-
stitutes just cause for discharge in the employment-at-will context. 132
It is clear, however, from the definitions of just cause that the result
depends on the nature of the job. The question has been extensively
considered in two areas of the law: in litigation under the due process
clause of the United States Constitution, which gives public employees
just-cause protection; and in the arbitration of discharge cases where
the employee was covered by a just-cause provision in a collective bar-
gaining contract. The answer is that, except for a limited number of
jobs such as military service, homosexuality alone is not cause for dis-
charge. 133 Moreover, these decisions should be applicable to the same
question arising under an implied contract to discharge only for cause.
1. Public Employment
Civil service systems govern discharge for most governmental em-
ployees. Most systems require just cause, thereby creating a statutory
exception to the employment-at-will rule. The United States Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act of 1978134 provides that an agency may remove, sus-
pend, furlough or reduce the grade or pay of a civil service employee
"only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."' 135
cause is defined statutorily in Puerto Rico, which provides compensation for an em-
ployee at will discharged without good cause, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (Supp.
1983):
Good cause for the discharge of an employee of an establishment shall be under-
stood to be:
(a) That the worker indulges in a pattern of improper or disorderly conduct.
(b) The attitude of the employee of not performing his work in an efficient man-
ner or of doing it belatedly and negligently or in violation of the standards of qual-
ity of the product produced or handled by the establishment.
(c) Repeated violations by the employee of the reasonable rules and regulations
established for the operation of the establishment, provided a written copy thereof
has been timely furnished to the employee.
(d) Full, temporary or partial closing of the operations of the establishment.
(e) Technological or reorganization changes as well as changes of style, design or
nature of the product made or handled by the establishment and in the services
rendered to the public.
(f) Reductions in employment made necessary by a reduction in the volume of
production, sales or profits, anticipated or prevalent at the time of the discharge.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185b (Supp. 1983).
132. See Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985), which
skirts the issue.
133. See, eg., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a), (b) (1982). For a summary of the remedial system avail-
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Prior to dismissal, a federal employee is entitled to receive advance
written notice, an opportunity to answer, the representation of an at-
torney, a written decision, and an opportunity to appeal.
136
"Efficiency of the service" generally denotes just cause, 137 and courts
have frequently applied the standard to the termination of homosexu-
als by federal, state, and local governments. The evolving majority rule
holds that governmental summary dismissal of a civilian homosexual
employee is not just cause for discharge, and thereby violates the due
process clause of the 5th and 14th amendments. 138 To establish just
able to insure fair treatment of federal employees, see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 365, 387-
88 (1983). See also Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employ-
ees? 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942 (1976); Tang, On the Legal Protection of Civil Service
Employees from Arbitrary Dismissal, 37 ADMIN. L. REV., 37 (Winter 1985); Removal
for Cause from the Civil Service: The Problem of Disproportionate Discipline, 28 AM.
U.L. REV. 207 (1979).
136. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)-(d) (1982) provides:
(b) An employee against whom an action is proposed is entitled to-
(1) at least 30 days advance written notice, unless there is reasonable cause to
believe the employee has committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment
may be imposed, stating the specific reasons for the proposed action;
(2) a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing
and to furnish affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of the answer;
(3) be represented by an attorney or other representative; and
(4) a written decision and the specific reasons therefor at the earliest practicable
date.
(c) An agency may provide, by regulation, for a hearing which may be in lieu of or in
addition to the opportunity to answer provided under subsection (b)(2) of this section.
(d) An employee against whom an action is taken under this section is entitled to
appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 7701 of this title. (em-
phasis added).
137. See Hatcher v. Department of the Air Force, 705 F.2d 1309, reh'g denied, 712
F.2d 1419 (11th Cir. 1983); Laden v. Crosson, 108 F. Supp. 240 (D.C. Pa. 1952);
Chauerdi, Legal Protection Available to Federal Employees Against Wrongful Dismissal,
63 Nw. U.L. REV. 287 (1968); Tang, On the Legal Protection of Civil Service Employees
from Arbitrary Dismissal, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 38 (Winter 1985). State employees enjoy
similar protection. See J. WEISBERGER, JOB SECURITY AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, 9-19,
45-65 (2d ed. 1973).
138, Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Smith v. Schlessinger,
513 F.2d 462, 476 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1975); McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th
Cir. 1973); Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207, 212 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Berg v. Clay-
ton, 436 F. Supp. 76, 80 (D.D.C. 1977); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 202-203
(N.D. Cal. 1977); Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cal. 1974);
Society for Individual Rights v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 339, 401 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd
on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975); Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory
Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L.
REV. 527, 537-540 (1979). See also McConnel v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D.
Minn. 1970); Board of Education of Long Beach v. Jac, M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 700-701,
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cause, the government agency must show that an employee's homosex-
uality directly impairs his ability to perform the job. 1 3 9
In Norton v. Macy 1  the leading case on unjust dismissal, the court
held that an employer must show a nexus between a worker's homosex-
uality and his job performance. In Norton a federal government em-
ployee was arrested for a traffic violation. The police notified Norton's
employer, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, of the
arrest. After Norton received a summons, NASA invited him to come
to headquarters for a talk. At headquarters, Norton admitted he had
homosexual desires and may have engaged in homosexual activities
when drunk. Subsequently, NASA fired him for "immoral, indecent,
566 P.2d 602, 604-05, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700, 705-06 (1977); Petit v. State Board of Educa-
tion, 10 Cal. 3d 29, 36, 513 P.2d 889, 894, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669-70 (1973); Morrison
v. State Board of Education, 1 Cal. 3d 214, 237-38, 461 P.2d 375, 386, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175, 193 (1969); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist., 88 Wash. 2d 286, 296-97, 559 P.2d
1340, 1346 (1977); Sefransky v. State Personnel Board, 62 Wis. 2d 464, 478, 215
N.W.2d 379, 383-84 (1974). See generally Levine, Legal Rights of Homosexuals in Pub-
lic Employment, 1978 SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAw 455 (1978); Rivera, Our Straight
Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 799, 818-20 (1979); Note, Dismissal of Homosexuals from Government Em-
ployment: The Developing Role of Due Process in Administrative Adjudications, 58 GEO.
L.J. 632 (1970).
139. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Homosexuality can effect an
individual's job performance if it impairs his ability to get a security clearance, Mc-
Keand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262, 1263 (9th Cir. 1974), Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d
740, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); Marks v. Schlesiner, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1377 (C.D. Cal.
1974), if the employee identifies his homosexuality with the employer, Singer v. U.S.
Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (1976), or if the employe "flaunts" his homo-
sexuality, Sefransky v. State Personnel Board, 62 Wis. 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (Sup. Ct.
1974). It is difficult to define "flaunting" precisely, and judges have often applied the
term to behavior they personally disapprove of. Synonyms include "flagrant" or "open
and notorious." In Sefransky, the discharge of a homosexual attendant in a mental
hospital who wore makeup and grabbed the leg of another attendant was upheld in part
because it was "so substantial, often repeated, flagrant, or serious that his retention in
service will undermine public confidence in the municipal service." Id. at 474, 215
N.W.2d at 384. In Singer v. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 530 F.2d 247 (1976) the
plaintiff was fired for, among other things, flaunting his homosexuality by kissing a male
in the building where he had been employed, being interviewed as a homosexual by the
press, dressing as a homosexual, and applying for a marriage license with another man.
In upholding the discharge, the court said that "the discharge was the result of appel-
lant's openly and publicly flaunting his homosexual way of life and indicating further
continuance of such activities" while identifying himself as a member of a federal
agency. Id. at 255. Similar actions by heterosexuals would not be so stigmatized.
140. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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and disgraceful conduct."'' The District of Columbia held the dis-
missal unconstitutional because NASA based its action solely on Nor-
ton's homosexuality without showing any relationship between his
sexual orientation and his job performance.1 42 A mere conclusion of
"immorality" is insufficient to establish the requisite just cause. Citing
several examples of conduct which might bear on job performance, in-
cluding potential blackmail, sexual advances made on the job, and no-
torious conduct, the court concluded that none existed in the instant
case.
Norton v. Macy '4 3 left the door open for the government to inquire
into and make employment decisions on the basis of an individual's
private sexual conduct.'" The government has conducted this inquiry
for teachers,141 military servicemen and women,14 6 and policeman, 47
and many courts have found a nexus between an individual's sexual
141 Id. at 1163.
142. Id. at 1167. "A reviewing court must at least be able to discern some reason-
ably foreseeable, specific connection between an employee's potentially embarrassing
conduct and the efficiency of the service. Once the connection is established it is for the
agency and the commission to decide whether it outweighs the loss to the service of a
particular competent employee." Id.
143 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
144. Id. at 1168. The Court stated: "we emphasize that we do not hold that homo-
sexual conduct may never be cause for dismissal of a protected federal employee. Nor
do we even conclude that potential embarrassment from an employee's private conduct
may in no circumstances affect the efficiency of the service." Id. One commentator has
characterized this limitation of the Norton decision as follows:
The court indicated that [the refusal to hire to discharge of a homosexual] would
pass constitutional muster if the agency proved that a decision to retain or hire
such an individual could result in a deleterious effect on the efficiency of the ser-
vice. Therein lies the fatal shortcoming of Norton. While the Norton majority
decried 'the notion that it could be an appropriate function of the federal bureau-
cracy to enforce the majority's conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of
its employees,' [it] failed to openly and forthrightly declare that one's sexual orien-
tation is no more rationally related to job qualification than one's gender, race, or
heritage. Thus, the court left the door open for governmental scrutiny into, and
employment related decisionmaking based on, an individual's atypical, private sex-
ual activtty.
Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment
Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 461, 539-540 (1979).
145. Thompson v. Southwest School District, 483 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D. Mo. 1980);
Hoagland v. Mount Vernon School District, 623 Wash. 2d 1156 (1981).
146. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc denied,
746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd sub nom., Belter v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
147. Childers v. Dallas Police Department, 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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preference and their inability to perform a job.'48 One must not, how-
ever, underestimate the importance of the Norton holding. In many
cases a dismissed employee will be able to show that homosexuality
does not affect job performance. In addition, it should be easier to
make such a showing in the private sector where jobs do not involve
the public interest or national security as do jobs in the military, the
police-force, and the schools.
2. Arbitration
Most collective bargaining contracts provide that an employer may
discharge only for cause, good cause, or just cause. 149 When an em-
ployee believes his employer fired him without cause, he can file a
grievance, which may progress to arbitration. Although the just-cause
standard arbitrators use is almost identical to that used in the public
employment context, most cases hold that homosexuality does not in-
terfere with job performance.
With respect to management's right to fire an employee for conduct
outside the plant, including homosexuality, arbitrators consistently
hold that there is no cause for discharge unless the employee's conduct
affects plant operations."' 0 One arbitrator, in language reminiscent of
the Norton v. Macy court, held that the adverse effect of an employee's
outside conduct on his employer's business must be reasonably discern-
ible;15 1 speculation as to the effect of the conduct is insufficient.
148. Indeed, one commentator asserted:
While courts have paid lip service to the illegality of automatic exclusionary poli-
cies by subjecting the government's conduct to rational basis review, they have
effectively precluded any meaningful challenge to such practices. After carefully
indicating that the government must always provide proof of a rational connection
between sexual orientation and a number of related factors loosely termed "effi-
ciency of the service," the courts then willingly either erect their own or accept
defendants' baseless rationalizations to legitimize such policies.
Friedman, supra note 144 at 540.
149. 2 Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts (BNA) § 40:1 (Dec. 28,
1978). Approximately 80% of collective bargaining agreements in the United States
grant just cause protection to employees. Id. In addition, some arbitrators will imply
just-cause protection in any collective bargaining agreement. E. ELKOURI & F.
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 652 (4th ed. 1983).
150. ELKOURI, supra note 149, at 657-658; 0. FAIRWEATHER, THE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION 240-43 (2d ed. 1983). See Sussman, Work Disci-
pline Versus Private Life: An Analysis of Arbitration Cases, 10 I.L.R. RESEARCH 3
(1964).
151. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 713, 714-715 (1963) (Mitten-
thai, Arb.).
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Although courts must decide the issue on a case-by-case basis, 152 con-
duct normally justifying dismissal includes behavior which renders an
employee unable to perform his duties or appear at work, behavior
which undermines the ability of the employer to direct the workforce,
behavior which harms the company's reputation or product, and be-
havior which leads to refusal, reluctance or inability of other employees
to work with the discharged employee.153 With respect to the latter
two kinds of behavior, arbitrators have been willing to consider the
prejudicial attitudes of others toward homosexual employees in decid-
ing whether cause existed for dismissal.154
In deciding grievances of discharged homosexuals, arbitrators con-
sistently evaluate the evidence more thoroughly than do courts when
deciding whether the government's discharge of a homosexual is con-
stitutional. In Ralph's Grocery Store,15 5 for example, the company
fired several employees who attended a party where a "lesbian show"
was performed. In deciding whether the discharged employee's actions
adversely affected the employer's business, the arbitrator noted that the
employer had the burden of proof and that management disapproval
alone did not constitute just cause. Moreover, judges and arbitrators
must apply the same standard to homosexuals that they apply to heter-
osexuals. Since there was no showing of an adverse effect, the em-
ployee was reinstated.
Arbitrators have even failed to find that an employee's egregious or
even illegal behavior caused an adverse effect on an employer's busi-
ness. In Hughes Air Corp. 16 the grievant, a male flight attendant, of-
fered to perform fellatio on a hotel attendant who came to his room to
inspect a malfunctioning bathtub. The arbitrator found no cause of
152. Inland Container Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 312, 314 (1957) (Ferguson,
Arb.). "The connection between the facts which occur and the extent to which the
business is affected must be reasonable and discernible. They must be such as could
logically be expected to cause some result in the employer's affairs. Each case must be
measured on its own merits."
153. W.E. Caldwell Co., Lab. Arb. (BNA) 434, 436-437 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.).
See also Marshall Brass Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 806, 808 (1982) (Keefe, Arb.); City of
Wilkes-Barre, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 33, 35 (1980) (Dunn, Arb.); Morris Lab, Inc., 50
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 632, 633 (1968) (McMahon, Arb.); The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 495, 497 (undated) (Livengood, Arb.).
154. See Hughes Air Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 148, 157-158 (1979) (Barsamian,
Arb.); Robert Shaw Controls Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local 1163, 64-2 ARB (CCH)
T 8748, 5613 (1964) (Duff, Arb.).
155. 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 867 (1981) (Kaufman, Arb.).
156. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 148 (1979) (Barsamian, Arb.).
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termination. There was no evidence that the grievant's conduct re-
sulted in the loss of business, and despite the fact that flight attendants
are held to a higher standard of off-duty conduct than most employees,
the attendant's commission of the single incident was insufficient to
establish his lack of fitness to perform his job. Furthermore there was
no evidence that employees had refused to work with the grievant or
the grievant had undermined the company's ability to direct the
workforce. A salient feature of the Hughes case is the repeated insis-
tence of the arbitrator that the company produce evidence of serious
harm to its business. 157
In Community College158 the grievant, a professor, was placed on
probation after pleading guilty to the misdemeanor of attempting to
engage in sexual misconduct with an undercover policeman. The col-
lege discharged him for immorality and unprofessional conduct.
Drawing on cases deciding whether the state's dismissal of a teacher
for homosexuality violated the due process clause, the arbitrator held
that immorality or unprofessional conduct could be grounds for dis-
charge only if it demonstrated a lack of fitness to teach. The arbitrator
found that the grievant's conduct did not impair his fitness to teach for
a number of reasons. The professor's students were of considerable
maturity compared to the grammar or secondary school students in-
volved in most of the decided cases. The grievant's conduct took place
away from the school, and it was unclear whether the academic com-
munity had knowledge of it earlier than the discharge date. More im-
portant there appeared to be no adverse effect on the grievant's
relations with his colleagues or students. In fact even with full knowl-
edge of the arrest, his supervisor recommended that the university re-
new his contract.
Even those few reported cases where an arbitrator has found just
cause for the discharge of a homosexual, the arbitrator has acknowl-
edged that cause exists only in extraordinary situations. In Robertshaw
Controls Company,'59 the grievant, an operator in a machine shop and
leader of a local Boy Scout troop, was convicted of committing sodomy
157. Id. at 157-158.
158. 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 687 (1985) (Goldberg, Arb.).
159. Robert Shaw Controls Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local 1163, 64-2 ARB
(CCH) 8748 (1964) (Duff, Arb.); but see Armco Steel Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 977,
981 (1964) (Kates, Arb.). Although an employee with long years of service was con-
victed of a morals charge, the arbitrator ordered conditional reinstatement. The effect
of the conviction on the business was uncertain. If an adverse effect developed, the
employer could discharge the employee.
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with and corrupting the morals of a minor. In upholding the dis-
charge, the arbitrator found a direct relation between the grievant's off-
duty conduct and his employment, attributable in large part to the spe-
cial circumstances of the case. The company was the largest employer
in a community of 1,200 people, and parents of the children in the Boy
Scout troop were fellow employees of the grievant. According to the
arbitrator, continued employment of the grievant in this unique situa-
tion would disrupt the company with conffict and hinder the business
of the employer.
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The public policy exception is the oldest and most common of the
exceptions to the employment-at-will rule."6 Many courts have held
that the discharge of an employee which violates a clear mandate of
public policy is illegal. This type of unlawful dismissal usually gives
rise to an action in tort for all the damages proximately resulting from
the discharge.' The major problem with the exception is the diffi-
160. Comment, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931 (1983).
In Peterman v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), the first case to adopt a public policy exception, the plaintiff
was fired for allegedly refusing to perjure himself at his employer's request. The Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could sue his employer for
wrongful discharge in a civil action. Allowing the suit would "more fully effectuate the
state's declared policy against perjury, "id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27, which was outlawed
by the California Penal Code, CALIF. PENAL CODE § 118 (West Supp. 1984). The
court explained:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and
sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee... on the ground
that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by stat-
ute .... To hold otherwise would be without reason and contrary to the spirit of
the law. The public policy of this state as reflected in the penal code.., would be
seriously impaired if it were to be held that one could be discharged by reason of
his refusal to commit perjury.
Peterman, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
161. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984);
Novosell v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying Pa. law);
Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1982); Novosell v.
Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying Penn. law); Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980);
Peterman v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959); Lampse v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 205 (1980).
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culty of defining public policy. Generally, courts have defined public
policy with reference to sources such as federal and state statutes or
constitutions. Some courts require applicable statutes to contain provi-
sions for a private cause of action or criminal penalties. 162 More liberal
courts have found the common law a satisfactory source. 16 3
The public policy exception presents several problems for advocates
of job security for homosexuals. In light of a recent Supreme Court
decision, it would be difficult to argue that there is a public policy pro-
tecting the right of individuals to engage in homosexual activity.164
Moreover, there is arguably a specific public policy against homosexu-
ality, evidenced by the fact that homosexual conduct such as sodomy
remains a crime in many states. Therefore, protection for homosexuals
will have to come from a general policy which is broad enough to en-
compass homosexuals. 165 This approach to the public policy excep-
162. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 756, 251(1) (West 1981); compare Sventko v.
Krolger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) with Brockmeyer v. Dunn &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983).
163. See Peterman v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 184 Cal. App. 2d
174, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178,
610 P.2d 1330, 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1980); Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
A majority of courts, however, require some statutory support before finding a public
policy exception. See, eg., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.
Mo. 1975); Rogers v. International Business Mach., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Penn.
1980).
164. In Bowers v. Hardwick, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), Hardwick who
had engaged in fellatio with another male in his bedroom was charged with violating the
Georgia statute outlawing sodomy. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). Before he was
convicted, he sued alleging that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
rejected Hardwick's argument that the statute violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. First, homosexuals have no fundamental right to engage in
sodomy, and the right claimed by Hardwick is clearly distinguishable from prior deci-
sions on fundamental rights which involved family relationships, marriage, and procrea-
tion. Nor can it be claimed that a right to engage in sodomy, which is criminal activity
in many states, is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." Moreover, the Court declared its strong resistance to
discovering new fundamental rights in the due process clause. Third, the fact that the
sodomy at issue took place in the privacy of Hardwick's home does not change the
result. And finally, the Court rejected Hardwick's argument that the law was unconsti-
tutional because there was no rational basis for it other than the belief of a majority of
the Georgia electorate that "homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." -
U.S. at -, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
165. In approximately half the states, homosexual conduct between consenting
adults in private is no longer a crime. Those states are Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
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tion, however, encounters theoretical problems. By definition, the
concern is with the public good, and any justice granted to an individ-
ual is merely incidental.' 66 The inevitable result is that in many cases,
injustice will remain unremedied. Job security will depend on whether
a particular discharge fortuitously falls within the policy exception.
Notwithstanding these problems, proponents of homosexual job se-
curity can still argue that in certain cases the discharge of a homosex-
ual violates public policy. The remainder of this section develops three
policy arguments: the policy favoring free speech, the policy in favor
of privacy, and the policy against sexual preference discrimination.
A. The Constitutional and Statutory Policies Favoring Free Speech
and the Exercise of Other Political Rights
The Constitution staunchly protects free speech in general and
speech directed toward political activity in particular. Courts, 1 6 7 as
sylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
Although homosexual activity is still technically a crime in Massachusetts, the
Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that the state has no legitimate interest in
criminalizing such conduct. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d
428 (1974); Commonwealth v. Scagliotti, 373 Mass. 626, 371 N.E.2d 726 (1977).
In the remaining states, however, private consensual sodomy between adults remains
a crime. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411
(West Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502
(West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 510.100 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (West Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 27, § 553-554 (1982); MASS. ANN LAWS CH. 272, § 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1970);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.158 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West Supp.
1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1978); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-177 (Michie 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS. § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982). Only six of the
state statutes specifically refer to sexual activity between members of the same sex.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1977); KAN. STAT. § 21-3505 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 510.100 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190
(1985); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974).
166. Comment, The Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing: A Common Ground
for the Torts of Wrongful Discharge from Employment, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1111,
1138-1140 (1980). See Comment, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1937, 1947-1950 (1983).
167. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). See N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982), quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
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well as state constitutions, 168 recognize freedom of political speech in
particular as the linchpin of democracy.169 This section demonstrates
that the broad societal policy favoring free speech will support a policy
exception to the employment-at-will rule.
1. Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
In Gay Law Students 7 0 the plaintiffs brought a class action against
Pacific Telephone on behalf of applicants for employment and employ-
ees of the company, alleging that the company had an illegal policy of
discriminating against homosexuals. They sought injunctive and de-
claratory relief as well as damages. The California Supreme Court, in a
decision with far reaching implications, held that the plaintiffs had sev-
eral causes of action.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant interfered with their polit-
ical freedom in violation of the California Labor Code. Sections 1101
and 1102 of the Code protect the rights of employees to engage in polit-
ical activity without interference by employers. 17' Employers cannot,
for example, prevent employees from engaging in political activity. 172
Nor can an employer force employees to follow or reject any political
theory. 173 Since the homosexual plaintiffs' activity was political, Pa-
cific Telephone's discriminatory policy attempted to coerce it and vio-
lated the labor code.
The plaintiffs in Gay Law Students 174 also sued the California Fair
Employment Practices Commission alleging that the Commission's re-
fusal to take remedial action violated the California Fair Employment
Practices Act. 175 The court held that the Act did not prohibit discrim-
168. Note, Free Speech, The Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE
L.J. 522, 529-30 (1982).
169. It should be noted that statutory prohibitions against religious discrimination
do not protect political speech or activity on the grounds that they constitute a creed.
"A religious belief includes mere personal preference grounded upon a non-theological
basis, such as personal choice deduced from economic or social theology." Yott v.
North American Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir. 1974). See Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 33 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
170. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
171. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1971).
172. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 1971).
173. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971).
174. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
175. Id. at 472, 595 P.2d at 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
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ination against homosexuals. 176 In so doing, it firmly rejected the ar-
guments that the Act prohibited discrimination in general and that the
legislature's enumeration of specific bases of discrimination was illus-
trative rather than restrictive.1
77
Gay Law Students is important for several reasons. First, it stands
for the proposition that the advocate's best strategy is to bring homo-
sexuals under the protection of general rights such as free speech and
statutes such as California Labor Code Sections 1101 and 1102. Sec-
ond, this case indicates that several sources of policy can cumulatively
make an overwhelming case for plaintiffs. 178 If only one cause of ac-
tion had been alleged in Gay Law Students, the plaintiffs might not
have recovered. By alleging multiple causes, the stronger ones sup-
ported the weaker. Finally, Gay Law Students adumbrates the argu-
ments that can support a public policy exception to the employment-at-
will rule.
2. Sources of Policy
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 179 provides
that Congress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech, or
the press,"'1  and this clause applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment.' 8 ' Since the First Amendment applies only to
governmental restrictions on free speech,182 it is unlikely that the Con-
stitution alone can serve as the source of a policy for an exception to
the employment-at-will rule.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that states may protect free
176. Id. at 473, 595 P.2d at 611-12, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
177. Id. at 473, 595 P.2d at 612, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
178. Id. at 464, 595 P.2d at 595, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE
DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.28 n.97.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982), quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); Jamison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Novosell v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894,
899 (3d Cir. 1983).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
181. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
182. See, e.g., Novosell v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir.
1983) (Applying Pa. law); Rozier v. St. Mary's Hospital, 88 Il. App. 3d 994, 1008, 411
N.E.2d 50, 57-58 (1980) (dissenting opinion); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 218-19, 536
P.2d 512, 516 (1975); Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 567, 335
N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983).
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speech beyond the scope of the First Amendment."8 3 Unlike the First
Amendment, many of the state free speech guarantees were enacted to
protect individual liberty rather than to limit governmental power. 18
4
Since federalism is not at issue regarding the enforcement of state con-
stitutions,18 5 the protections granted are affirmative and broad. The
California Constitution, for example, provides:
Every person may freely speak, write, and publish his or her senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.
This affirmative guarantee is representative of those in forty-three other
state constitutions.18
7
Many states have also enacted legislation to protect the political ac-
tivities of employees.18 8 The scope of protection provided by the stat-
183. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Note, Private
Abridgment of Speech and The State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 178 (1980). See
R. RANKIN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1960). Grad, The State
Bill of Rights, in 6 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE
117 (1980); Note, Free Speech, The Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE
L.J. 522, 541 (1982).
184. See R. RANKIN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS 4-5 (1960);
Grad, The State Bill of Rights, in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NA-
TIONAL AND STATE 117, 118 (1980); cf THE FEDERALIST, No. 84 (A. Hamilton). In
Rozier v. St. Mary's Hospital, 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 1008, 411 N.E.2d 50, 64 (1980)
(dissenting opinion), one judge recognized the possibility of using state constitutional
protection of free speech as a source of policy in wrongful discharge cases.
185. Note, Free Speech, The Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE
L.J. 522, 541-542 (1982); see Yackle, The Burger Court, State Action, and Congressional
Enforcement of the Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. REv. 479, 484-485 (1975).
186. CAL. CONST., art. I § 2. Similarly, the New York Constitution provides
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right." N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 8 (McKinney 1968).
187. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§ 6; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 4; GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 4; IOWA
CONST. art. I, § 7; KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 11; Ky. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 8; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 7; ME. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 40; MASS. CONST. art.
77; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; MiSs. CONST. art. III, § 13,
MO. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5; Nnv.
CoNST. art. I, § 9; N.H. CONST. Part I, art. 22d; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.D. CONT. art. I, § 9;
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5; TENN. CoNST. art. I, § 19; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 13; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5; WIS. CONsT. art. I, § 3;
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20; cf DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5.
188. For a compilation of these laws see L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL §§
10,01010.52; [1980] 1 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 43.045. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
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utes varies from negligible to substantial. The narrower laws protect
the integrity of the electoral process and prohibit employers from inter-
fering with an employer's right to vote, run for office, or sign petitions.
The Nevada statute subjects an employer who prohibits an employee
from engaging in politics or becoming a candidate for public office to a
fine and/or civil damages."8 9 The more specific Ohio law prohibits an
employer from posting or placing in pay envelopes statements or
threats intended to influence the political actions or votes of employees
and from refusing to allow an employee to serve as an election offi-
cial. 9 These narrower laws would not support a policy exception for
political activities.
Several states, however, broadly protect employee political activities.
California Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102, which were a basis of
recovery in Gay Law Students, provide as follows:
§ 21-236 (Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE ART. 33, § 126-16-(6) (Supp. 1983); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (1978); N.Y. ELEC. LAW, § 17-150(3) (McKinney
1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-23-6 (1981).
189. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.040-613.060, 613.070 (1979). § 613.040 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation doing business or employ-
ing labor in the State of Nevada to make any rule or regulation prohibiting or
preventing any employee from engaging in politics or becoming a candidate for any
public office in this state.
The other sections concern remedies and the responsibility of a corporation for the acts
of its agents.
190. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.05, 3599.06 (1972). § 3599.05 provides:
No employer or his agent or a corporation shall print or authorize to be printed
upon any pay envelopes any statements intended or calculated to influence the
political action of his or its employees; or post or exhibit in the establishment or
anywhere in or about the establishment any posters, placards, or hand bills con-
taining any threat, notice, or information that if any particular candidate is elected
or defeated work in the establishment will cease in whole or in part, or other
threats expressed or implied, intended to influence the political opinions or votes of
his or its employees.
Whoever violates this section is guilty of corrupt practices, and shall be punished
by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.
§ 3599.06 provides:
No employer, his officer or agent, shall discharge or threaten to discharge an
elector for taking a reasonable amount of time to vote on election day; or require or
order an elector to accompany him to a voting place upon such day; or refuse to
permit such elector to serve as an election official on any registration or election
day; or indirectly use any force or restraint or threaten to inflict any injury, harm,
or loss; or in any other manner practice intimidation in order to induce or compel
such person to vote or refrain from voting for or against any person or question or
issue submitted to the voters.
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than five
hundred dollars.
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Section 1101. No employer shall make, adopt or enforce any rule,
regulation or policy... (b) controlling or directing, or tending to
control or direct the political activities of affiliations of employees.
Section 1102. No employer shall coerce or influence or attempt to
coerce or influence his employees through or by any means of
threat or discharge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or
refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of
political action or political activity.19
Similar statutes exist in Louisiana 192 and Connecticut. 193 The Con-
necticut law provides that any employer who subjects an employee to
discipline or discharge on account of that employee's exercise of First
Amendment rights or comparable sections of the Connecticut Consti-
tution shall be liable for damages, including punitive damages and at-
torney's fees.
1 9 4
Commentators have criticized these laws on several grounds.'95
First, the typical penalty,1 96 which is normally a small criminal fine, is
191. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1971). See Note, California's Controls
on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015 (1970).
192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:961 (West 1964) provides:
No... employer shall adopt or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy which will
control, direct, or tend to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of
his employees by means of threats of discharge or loss of employment in case such
employees should support or become affiliated with any particular political faction
or organization, or participate in political activities of any nature or character.
193. 1983 Conn. Acts 83-578 provides:
Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision
thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the
exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the
United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the constitution of
the state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with
the employee's bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the
employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by
such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attor-
ney's fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages. If the court deter-
mines that such action for damages was brought without substantial justification,
the court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the employer.
194. Id. Cited in Magnam v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 564, 479 A.2d 781,
784, n.13 (1984).
195. See Note, Protecting Private Employees' Freedom of Political Speech, 18 HARV.
J. LEGISL. 35, 39 (1981).
196. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., § 16-304(B) (1975) ($5,000 fine); MD.
ANN. CODE, art. 33 § 26-16(b) (1957) (four-year ban on holding public office and one
year imprisonment and/or $1,000 fine); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (1978)
(imprisonment for not more than one year); NEv. REV. STAT. § 613.050 (1979) (fine of
not more than $500); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.05 (1972) (fine of between $500
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too insignificant to deter employer abuse. Second, since employees are
generally unable to bring suit and state prosecutors are unenthusiastic
about doing so, 197 these laws do not provide the relief that the legisla-
tures intended. Nevertheless, some laws do provide more than minor
sanctions,'9" and constitute a statement of public policy.
At the federal level, the National Labor Relations Act' 99 in certain
instances protects an employee's political speech. Section 7 provides
that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations ... and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection...zo
Under the NLRA, it is an "unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise" of these
rights."z ' If the phrase "mutual aid or protection" includes political
speech unrelated to unionization or collective bargaining, the NLRA
will protect such speech from being abridged by an employer.202 All
employees working for employers subject to the NLRA are protected,
for the rights the Act guarantees are not restricted to unionized em-
ployers or union organization campaigns.20 3 The political activities,
and $1,000), § 3599.06 (fine of between $50 and $500); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-23-6
(1981) (forfeiture of right to vote or hold public office).
197. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal. Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 495 (1976).
198. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1105 (West 1971) (civil right of action for damages); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-2-108(2) (1973) (action for damages caused by employer's interference
with employee's running for office); 1983 Conn. Act. 83-578 (civil action for damages);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, 5162 (1985) (action for $500 in damages for employer coer-
cion of an employee's vote); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:961 (West 1964) (civil action
for damages); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 136 (1966) (civil action for damages for inter-
ference with political party membership).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1976).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
202. Such protection, however, may be moot because of labor law preemption. If
an activity is either arguably protected, as may be the case with political speech, or
arguably prohibited under the NLRA, then under the primary jurisdiction doctrine,
only the National Labor Relations Board can exercise jurisdiction over the activity. See
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
203. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Walls Manufac-
turing Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963), enforcing 137 NLRB 1317
(1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v.
NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
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however, would have to be "concerted," meaning directed toward a
goal of benefiting all employees of an employer.2"
In Eastex v. NLRB, 2°5 an employer denied union employees permis-
sion to distribute a newsletter in non-work areas on their own time.
The newsletter contained one article urging employees to defeat right
to work legislation being considered in Texas and another attacking
President Nixon's veto of an increase in the federal minimum wage. It
also urged workers to vote to "defeat our enemies and elect our
friends." The union filed an unfair labor practice action against the
employer, arguing that the NLRA protected the newsletter as con-
certed activity for the "mutual aid or protection" of employees. The
Supreme Court held that "mutual aid or protection" is not limited to
specific disputes between an employer and his employees. It includes
support for employees of other employers and improvement of the
terms and conditions of employment "through channels outside the
immediate employer-employee relationship."20 6 Although the Court
read the NLRA's phrase broadly enough to include some political
speech by employees, it indicated limits without precisely delineating
them. Generally, the closer the relationship between political speech
and the immediate economic interests of employees, the more likely the
speech will be considered "other mutual aid or protection."
It thus appears that there are clear policies in American society
favoring freedom of speech in general and political speech in particu-
lar. Since some of the policies prohibit only governmental interference,
however, it is necessary to examine the effect of the state-action re-
quirement under the First Amendment.
167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 845 (1948); LESLIE, LABOR LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 89 (1979).
204. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984); NLRB v. Charles
H. McCauley Associates, Inc., 657 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1981), enforcing in part 248
NLRB 346 (1980); Meyers Industries II, 278 NLRB No. 118 (1986); Meyers Industries,
Inc., 268 NLRB No. 73 (1984).
205. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
206. Id. at 565. See Puerto Rico Food Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 153 (lst
Cir. 1980); Abilities & Goodwill, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1973); American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88
(7th Cir. 1964); Dobbs House, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963); NLRB v.
Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 845 (1948); Bide-A-Wee Home Ass'n, 248 NLRB 853 (1980).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/3
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
3. State Action and Freedom of Speech
Courts have interpreted the First Amendment, which by its terms
applies only to Congress, to protect the rights of state and federal em-
ployees to comment on matters of public or private concern.20 7 The
First Amendment does not protect private employees unless their em-
ployer is so connected to the government that its action is considered
state action. 20 8 The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
state-action requirement strictly, 2 9 and it is unlikely that any private
employer is bound by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
One way to obviate the requirement would be to include private
abridgement of freedom of speech within the prohibition of the First
Amendment. Some commentators have suggested that constitutional
limitations imposed on the exercise of governmental power should also
be applied to private organizations.2 t ° Their arguments rest on the
207. See, e.g., Connik v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980); Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); National Gay
Task Force v. Oklahoma City Board of Education, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984),
aff'd by an equally divided court, -U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985); Leonard v. City of
Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir.
1980); James v. Board of Education, 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1042 (1972); Bickel v. Burkhart, 462 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Tex. 1978). See generally J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1001-03 (1983); Kauf-
man, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761
(1970); Note, Nonpartisan Speech in the Police Deparmtent: The Aftermath of Picker-
ing, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1001 (1980).
208. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811
(1968).
209. State action will exist if the entity in question performs a public function, see
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Balti-
more, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945), or if there is
significant state involvement, see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961). The latter test requires "a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be
treated as that of the state itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
351 (1974). See also Rendel-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis. 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967);
Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 256 N.Y.S.2d 792, 204 N.E.2d 627 (1965);
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-1162 (1978); Note, Creditors Reme-
dies as State Action, 89 YALE L.J. 538, 540-545 (1980).
210. A.S. MILLER, PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 13 (Occa-
sional Paper for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 1959); Berle, Con-
stitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from
Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 953 (1952); Blades, supra
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perceptions that the power of such entities is quasi-governmental and
that their intrusion on the average individual's life is comparable to or
greater than the government's.21 This is the reverse of the balance of
power between governmental and non-governmental bodies at the time
of the ratification of the Constitution.2" 2 However laudable and justifi-
able these proposals may be, they are unlikely to have any practical
consequences in the near future.
A second approach was adopted in Novosell v. Nationwide Insurance
Company.213 After working without reprimand for an insurance com-
pany for fifteen years, the plaintiff, a district sales manager, was fired
because he refused his employer's request to lobby the Pennsylvania
legislature for no-fault insurance legislation.2 4 He alleged that the ter-
mination violated the public policy protecting his First Amendment
rights. The court found that a wrongful discharge claim could be
shown where the termination abridged a recognized public policy.215
The court concluded that the First Amendment could be a source of
public policy. After examining the cases involving public employees,
the court noted that the policy was not confined to instances of state
action. Whenever the power to fire is used to control an employee's
political activity an important policy is violated.
The inquiry before us is whether the concern for the rights of
political expression and association which animated the public
employee cases is sufficient to state a public policy under Penn-
sylvania law. While there are no Pennsylvania cases squarely on
this point, we believe that the clear direction of the opinions
note 49 at 1421; Pick, Unjust Discharge from Employment: A Necessary Change in the
Law, 40 OHIO STAT. L.J. 2 (1979); Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1816, 1837 n.10 (1980); Note, Non-Statutory Cause of Action for an Employer's Termi-
nation of an 'At Will' Employment Relationship: A Possible Solution to the Economic
Imbalance in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 743 (1970).
Contra Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and 'Governmental Action,' 70
YALE L.J. 345, 348 (1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1959).
211. See D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE CORPORATION 12-14 (1977); Note,
California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1015, 1018-19 (1970); Note, Protecting Private Employees' Freedom of Political Speech,
18 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 35, 38 (1981).
212. Blades, supra note 49, at 1431.
213. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
214. Id. at 896.
215. Id. at 898.
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promulgated by the state's courts suggests that this question be
answered in the affirmative.2 16
The court then held that the plaintiff's allegation stated a cause of ac-
tion, thereby extending the public policy exception in Pennsylvania to
.a non-constitutional claim where a corporation conditions employ-
ment upon political subordination.,
217
The Court in Novosell also indicated that the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion was also a valid source of policy. 218 It has been pointed out that
all states guarantee freedom of speech.2 19 Many of these guarantees
are affirmative, and most do not contain an explicit state-action re-
quirement. The states may go beyond the protections the First
Amendment extends to free speech. In Robbins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center the California Supreme Court held that the state's constitu-
tional guarantee of free speech applied to a privately owned shopping
center.22 ° The holding, which was not premised on a finding of state
action, was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.2 2 1 In addi-
tion, the California Supreme Court in Gay Law Students noted that the
equal protection clause of the California Constitution contained no ex-
plicit state-action requirement.2 22 While it would be guided by federal
decisions construing the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court refused to be bound by them. Instead, it ex-
panded the meaning of state-action and found that a public utility was,
216. Id. at 900.
217. Id., citing Sacks v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 502 Pa. 201,
465 A.2d 981 (1983); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174
(1974).
218. Id. at 899. The relevant portion of Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution states:
The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of
man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
219. See notes 183-187 supra and accompanying text.
220. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd sub nom.,
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). The holding was justified
by the fact that shopping centers are public forums. 23 Cal. 3d at 907, 910-11, 592 P.2d
at 345, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 858, 860. There was no finding that the curtailment of free
speech by the shopping center owner constituted state action. The court merely stated
that "the public interest in peaceful speech outweighs the desire of property owners for
control over their property." Id. at 909, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 860.
221 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
222. Gay Law Students, 24 Cal. 3d at 468, 595 P.2d at 598, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
For a full discussion of Gay Law Students see notes 170-178 supra and accompanying
text.
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in effect, a governmental entity.2 23 Gay Law Students clearly suggests
that free speech guarantees in state constitutions can be used to cir-
cumvent the federal state-action requirement.
In states which require some form of state action 224 there are typi-
cally few decisions interpreting the term. Courts are, therefore, free to
define it broadly. They can follow earlier, more liberal federal cases
which found state action whenever a private entity performed a public
function225 or became entangled with the government.226 Or they can
use a more expansive definition of state action. For example, judicial
denial of recovery to an employee discharged for political expression
could be interpreted as state action. It has been suggested that corpo-
rations should be considered state agencies since they operate under
state charters. The most liberal approach would be to follow Novosell
and dispense with state action altogether because the policy favoring
freedom of speech outweighs it.
Some courts have already used state constitutions to prohibit private
interference with freedom of speech. In Freedman v. New Jersey State
Police227 the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the owner of an
agriculture labor camp could not exclude members of the press who
wished to interview workers in the camp because New Jersey's guaran-
tee of free speech was broader than the First Amendment's.228 The
Michigan Supreme Court229 and the Washington Court of Appeals 2 0
223. 23 Cal. 3d at 469, 595 P.2d at 598, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
224. See HAWAII CONST. art. I § 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 9; OR. CONST. art. I § 8;
S.C. CONsT. art. I § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I § 15; W. VA. CONsT. art. III § 7.
225. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). A town in Alabama completely
owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation forbade the distribution of religious litera-
ture on two sidewalks. The Supreme Court held that since the company town "had all
the characteristics of any other American town," id. at 502, and functioned like a regu-
lar town, it was subject to the restrictions of the First Amendment. Thus, the ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of religious literature was unconstitutional.
226. See Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 288-89, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975). The defendant was a private defense contractor who, the Court held, had "con-
tractually assumed" the responsibility to honor the free speech rights of its employees
because the government's involvement in the defendant's business was so great. The
federal government owned the land, buildings, and a majority of the equipment used in
the business, which consisted primarily of supplying weapons to the military.
227. 135 N.J. Super. 297, 343 A.2d 148 (1975).
228. Id. at 301, 343 A.2d at 151.
229. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370
Mich. 547, 563-74, 122 N.W.2d 785, 793-99 (1963).
230. Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, 3 Wash. App. 833, 846, 478 P.2d
792, 799, appeal denied, 79 Wash. 2d 1005 (1971).
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used similar reasoning to uphold, respectively, handbilling and signa-
ture gathering in shopping centers.
Novosell held that either the Pennsylvania constitution or the first
amendment could support a policy exception for political expres-
sion.2 31 Perhaps because it considered either source alone sufficient, it
ignored the possibility that the two could combine to support the ex-
ception. The first amendment and the case law behind it show the im-
portance of free speech and political activity to the maintenance of a
democratic society. They evidence a general policy in favor of free
speech, which was limited to governmental interference because the
drafters thought they lacked the power to reach private interference.
State constitutions, with their relaxed notion of state action, used in
tandem with the first amendment can reach private interference, ex-
actly as the founding fathers intended the federal system to operate.
This approach has been hinted at by the Court as it withdrew from
restraining abridgment of free speech in privately owned shopping cen-
ters and as a commentator advocated:
the considerations of federalism that have dictated the Court's
withdrawal from the private abridgment field, together with the
contemporary impact of private abridgment on the expression sys-
tem . . . , dictate that the states enter and protect persons against
private abridgment.2 32
4. Homosexuality as Speech or Political Activity
Many actions by homosexuals other than sexual conduct can, de-
pending on the context, qualify as speech.2 33 Obviously, a homosex-
ual's appearance on television to discuss homosexuality2 34 or before a
231. Novosell v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983).
232. Note, Private Abridgement of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J.
165, 177 (1980). See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976), "While statutory or
common law may in some situations extend protection or provide redress against a
private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expression of others, no
such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution itself."
233. See, e.g., NGTF v. Oklahoma City Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.
1984), aff'd by an equally divided court, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985); Gay Stu-
dents Org. of Univ. of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1974);
Acanfora v. Board of Education, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974); Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977); Fricke v.
Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980). But cf Rowland v. Mad River Local School
Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985).
234. Acanfora v. Board of Education 491 F.2d 498, 501, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974),
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court to discuss gay rights235 is speech. The reach of the First Amend-
ment is broad and protects such non-traditional forms of speech as a
gay rights organization's sponsorship of social events2 36 and the right
of a young man to take a male date to his high school prom.237 It can
also be argued that other behavior associated with homosexuals such as
modes of dress and mannerisms is a form of speech.238 Going to gay
bars and socializing with other men may be within the ambit of the
First Amendment as an associational right.2 39 Indeed, many oppo-
nents of homosexual rights readily admit the communicative nature of
such conduct. An Oklahoma statute,"4 which an equally divided
Supreme Court recently struck down as violating the First Amend-
ment,z4 1 punished teachers for homosexual conduct. The ordinance
regulated conduct such as advocating or promoting public or private
homosexual activity so as to create a substantial risk that such conduct
will come to the attention of school children or school employees.242
Armed with such a statute, prosecutors could easily argue that effemi-
nate mannerisms or merely associating with homosexuals was homo-
sexual conduct.
Under state laws prohibiting an employer from interfering with his
employees' participation in politics, political activity was originally
limited to involvement in the process of government.243 In Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation v. Superior Court,244 an early case construing the
provisions of California Labor Code Sections 1101 and 1102,245 the
235. Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980).
236. Gay Students Org. of Univ. of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1974). See Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169 (1972); Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972); New Left Educ.
Project v. Board of Regents, 326 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 541 (1972).
237. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
238. See Singer v. U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976);
Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 661 (Ist Cir. 1974).
239. See id.; Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 487-488,
595 P.2d 592, 610-611, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32 (1979).
240. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15 (1985 West Supp.).
241. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270
(10th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided court, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
242. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15(A)(2) (1985 West Supp.).
243. Note, Protecting Private Employees' Freedom of Political Speech, 18 HARV. J.
ON LEGISL. 35, 60-62 (1981).
244. 28 Cal. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946).
245. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1971).
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defendant, a defense contractor, fired several employees for security
reasons. In response to the employees' suit alleging that the discharges
interfered with their political activities, Lockheed argued that the stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague. The California Supreme Court nar-
rowly construed the scope of the statute:
In each case the interference prescribed by the statute is interfer-
ence with "political activities or affiliations," and the test is not
membership in or activities connected with any particular group
or organization, but whether those activities are related to or con-
nected with the orderly conduct of government and the peaceful
organization, regulation and administration of government.246
Under this test, a court would consider to be political only activity
directed toward the normal functions of government such as partisan
politics, running for office, sponsoring legislation, lobbying the legisla-
ture, and introducing referenda.
In Gay Law Students24 7 the California Supreme Court significantly
expanded the scope of "political activity." The court found that em-
ployees' self-identification as homosexuals could bring them within
Sections 1101 and 1102.248 The court noted that the application of the
sections should not be limited to "partisan activity." '249 Acknowledg-
ing the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, which has found engaging
in litigation, 25 wearing armbands,251 and the association with others
to promote a cause252 to be political, the court found that:
Measured by these standards, the struggle of the homosexual com-
munity for equal rights, particularly in the field of employment,
must be recognized as a political activity. Indeed the subject of
the rights of homosexuals incites heated political debate today,
and the "gay liberation movement" encourages its homosexual
246. 28 Cal. 2d at 485, 171 P.2d at 24. The court defined the word "political" as
follows:
Of or pertaining to the exercise of the rights and privileges or the influence by
which the individuals of a state seek to determine or control its public policy; hav-
ing to do with the organization or action of individuals, parties, or interests that
seek to control the appointment or action of those who manage the affairs of state.
Id. at 484-85, 171 P.2d at 24.
247. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 487, 595 P.2d
592, 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32 (1979).
248. Id. at 487, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
249. Id.
250. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
251. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
252. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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members to attempt to convince other members of society that
homosexuals should be accorded the same fundamental rights as
heterosexuals. The aims of the struggle for homosexual rights,
and the tactics employed, bear a close analogy to the continuing
struggle for civil rights waged by blacks, women, and other
minorities.253
Since an important aspect of the gay rights movement is the encourage-
ment of men and women to associate with other homosexuals, the tele-
phone company's policy of not hiring individuals who are gay, or who
are identified with gay organizations, was an attempt to control the
political activities of employees.254
B. The Right of Privacy
Although the Supreme Court recognized a constitutionally guaran-
teed right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,255 the right has been
difficult to define.256 Griswold held that the right was violated by a
statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives by married couples.
Subsequently, the Court extended the right to the use of contraceptives
by unmarried couples,257 a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy 258 and certain other fundamental decisions about
family relations.2 9 The Supreme Court abruptly halted this gradual
expansion in Bowers v. Hardwick,26° which held that the right of pri-
vacy does not protect sodomy and other private sexual activity between
consenting adult homosexuals from state prohibition.26' The decision
253. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488, 595 P.2d
592, 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32 (1979).
254. The decision was limited to discrimination "against persons who identify
themselves as homosexuals who defend homosexuality, or who are identified with ac-
tivist homosexual organizations." Id. at 488, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
255. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
256. See generally D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986);
Richards, Constitutional Privacy and Homosexual Love, N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 895, 895-899 (1986).
257. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
258. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
259. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
260. 54 U.S.L.W. 4919 (June 30, 1986).
261. - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). See Dunlap, BriefAmicus Curiae, Bowers v.
Hardwick, 14 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 949 (1986); Richards, Constitutional
Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 808 (1986) (criticizing the
decision).
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elucidates that the federal constitution cannot support a public policy
exception based on the right to privacy.
There are, however, other sources of the right of privacy. Some
states have statutes which create a privacy right.262 Massachusetts, for
example, protects a person against unreasonable, substantial or serious
interference with his privacy.26 In addition, there is the common law
tort of invasion of privacy2 that may give protection to homosexuals.
Courts have occasionally recognized a policy exception based on pri-
vacy when an employee has been fired for refusing to answer an em-
ployer's personal inquiries.265 In Cort v. Bristol Myers Co.,266 several
employees refused to answer questions on a personnel form which they
claimed were personal and unrelated to their jobs. Although it denied
recovery in this particular case because some of the information re-
fused was a matter of public record, the court acknowledged that an
employee could not be fired for failing to complete an unreasonably
intrusive questionnaire.267
This is especially true with respect to requests for information which
262. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (1972); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1910); CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (1972); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1981); HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5
(1968); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1970); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1974); MONT. CONST. art.
II, § 10 (1972); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1971); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1889).
Alaska's constitution, for example, provides that "[t]he right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (1972). In some
states, Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Washington, the con-
stitutional right to privacy is connected with prohibitions against unreasonable searches.
263. MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 214 § 1B (1974). In Bratt v. IBM Corp., 392 Mass.
508, 467 N.E.2d 126 (1984), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the disclosure
of private medical facts about an employee through intracorporate communication is
sufficient publication to impair an employee's right to privacy. Id. at 515, 467 N.E.2d at
134. See Bratt v. IBM Corp., 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986).
264. In order to recover for an invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must prove that he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the alleged intrusion and that his
privacy was, in fact, invaded. Although harm is theoretically presumed if an invasion is
proved, it is likely that homosexuals alleging an invasion of privacy will also have to
prove actual harm such as psychological, occupational, social, and similar damages.
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 5.03[3][a][ii] (R. Achtenberg, ed. 1985). See
generally W. KEETON & W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984). See
also Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1st Cist.
1984); Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Mass. 1985); Cort v.
Bristol-Meyers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982).
265. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979). Ac-
cord Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
266. 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982).
267. Id. at 308 n.9, 431 N.E.2d at 912 n.9.
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the legislature has prohibited an employer from making. In Massachu-
setts such requests include information about criminal268 and mental
health care2 69 histories of applicants or employees. Moreover, the
court in Cort noted that recovery was also possible for intrusive re-
quests that were not within the scope of such protective legislation.270
The reasonableness of an inquiry depends on the nature of the job (with
higher level jobs justifying broader and more personal inquiries than
menial jobs) and on whether the information sought is relevant to job
performance. When an employer asks about an employee's sexual ori-
entation, a court's concern would be essentially the same as in Norton
v. Macy-whether a nexus existed between the employee's sexuality
and his ability to perform the job.271  The reasoning of Cort should
enable a Massachusetts employee fired for refusing to answer questions
about his sexual orientation to sue for unjust dismissal, alleging that his
discharge violated public policy protecting his privacy.
C. Sexual Preference Discrimination Statutes as a Source of Policy
In Wisconsin,2 72 the District of Columbia,271 and a large number of
municipalities' legislatures, including New York City, San Francisco,
Berkeley, Detroit, Seattle, and Minneapolis, have enacted laws prohib-
iting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.274 Since these
268. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 151 B, § 4(9) (1974).
269. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 151 B, § 4(9A) (1974).
270. 385 Mass. 300, 306-307, 431 N.E.2d 908, 912 (1982).
271. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
272. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.32, 111.36 & 111.37 (West Supp. 1983-84).
273. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 6-2221 (West Supp. 1978-79).
274. See, e.g., Alfred, N.Y., Village Ordinance, art. II, Equal Rights and Opportu-
nities (May 6, 1974); Ann Arbor, Mich., City Code tit. IX, ch. 112, §§ 9:151-9:153
(1972); Austin, Tex., Ordinance 75 9710-A (July 10, 1975); 306. Berkeley, Cal., Munici-
pal Code ch. 13-28; Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 46, 148-N.S. (Oct. 30, 1973); Bloom-
ington, Ind., Human Rights Ordinance 75-67 (Dec. 4, 1975); Boston, Mass., Mayor's
Executive Order (April 12, 1976); Chapel Hill, N.C., Personnel Ordinance, art. IV
(Sept. 16, 1975); Cupertion, Cal., Affirmative Action Plan, adopted pursuant to Resolu-
tion No. 3833 (Feb. 10, 1975); Detroit, Mich., City Charter, Declaration of Rights, 1 2
ch. 10, § 7-1004 (1974); East Lansing, Mi.ch., City Code tit. I, ch. 4, §§ 1.124, 1.136,
1.127 (1973); Howard County, Md., County Council Legislative Bill No. 38 (Oct. 20,
1975); Los Angeles, Cal., Affirmative Action Program (May 10, 1976); Madison, Wis.,
City Code, Equal Opportunities Ordinance, § 3.23 (1975); Marshall, Minn., City Per-
sonnel Manual (1975); Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances, Civil Rights, ch. 945
(1975); Mountain View, Cal., Resolution No. 10435 (Mar. 31 1975); New York, N.Y.,
Municipal Code § 131-7.2; Palo Alto, Cal., Municipal Code §§ 2.22.05-22.070 (1974);
Portland, Ore., Resolution No. 31510 (Dec. 18, 1974); San Francisco, Cal., Administra-
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ordinances are of recent vintage, it is difficult to assess their importance
in protecting the rights of homosexuals.
27 5
Many of the ordinances were enacted in an effort to expand existing
human rights laws by including sexual preference discrimination
among the prohibited kinds of discrimination. Accordingly, the dis-
crimination some states prohibit is subject to the same jurisdictional,
procedural, and remedial limitations applicable to discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap. For
example, anti-discrimination statutes often limit their coverage to em-
ployers employing a minimum number of workers and contain strict
procedural requirements, such as a short statute of limitations or
mandatory mediation and conciliation efforts.27 6 Since the remedies
available under most human rights law evolve from the make-whole
theory, ordinances prohibiting sexual preference discrimination usually
limit recovery to equitable remedies such as back pay and reinstate-
ment. 27 7 Because of this limitation, many discharged homosexuals in
jurisdictions prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination find them-
selves with an inadequate remedy. Moreover, the delay and ineffi-
ciency of pursuing an equitable remedy before an administrative
agency will discourage them further. Since such plaintiffs often prefer
a common law remedy, the issue whether the ordinances can also be
the source of a policy exception inevitably arises.
tive Code ch. 128 (1972); San Francisco, Cal., Municipal Code art. 33, §§ 3301-3303,
§§ 3306-3308 (1978); San Jose, Cal., Affirmative Action Hiring Policy Manual (1974);
San Mateo County, Cal., Ordinance Code, Div. III, Pt. 4, ch. 1, §§ 3901 & 3905(e)
(1975); Santa Barbara, Cal., Resolution No. 8166 (Dec. 30, 1075); Seattle, Wash., Fair
Employment Practices Ordinance 102562 (Sept. 10, 1973); Sunnyvale, Cal., Memoran-
dum No. 90.912 (Dec. 11, 1974); Yellow Springs, Ohio, Ordinance 75-20 (July 5, 1975).
See NATIONAL GAY TASK FORCE, GAY RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA (1985).
275 For general discussions of these ordinances, see Meeker, Dombrink & Geis,
State Law and Local Ordinances in California Barring Discrimination on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745 (1985); Pearldaughter, Employment
Discrimination Against Lesbians: Municipal Ordinances and Other Remedies, 8
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 537 (1979); Comment, Challenging Sexual Preference Dis-
crimination in Private Employment, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 525-527 (1980).
276. See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-5;
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.36, 111.39, 111.39(1); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 6-2221, 6-2284
(West Supp. 1978-79).
277. This contrasts with the public policy exception, which is normally a tort cause
of action, entitling the plaintiff to compensatory and punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330
(1980); L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 3.02 (1985).
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The argument in favor views the statute not only as an express pro-
hibition against sexual preference discrimination, but also as a declara-
tion of policy. According to the argument, an appropriate legislative
body had declared that employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation is intolerable. For administratiye reasons, however, it ex-
cluded adequate remedies and failed to expand the definition of sexual
orientation to include matters of personal appearance or mannerisms.
Nevertheless, such discrimination is equally contrary to declared pol-
icy and equally deserving of a remedy. Thus, courts should apply the
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. Gay rights litigants
can make the same argument about the procedural and jurisdictional
limitations of ordinances.2 78
Although no courts have addressed these issues, there is precedent
for using discrimination statutes as the basis for a policy exception. In
Williamson v. Provident State Bank,2 79 the employer bank demoted the
plaintiff allegedly because a man working in her position would
strengthen the company's image. Since the bank had less than fifteen
(15) employees, the plaintiff could not sue under either Title VII or the
applicable state fair employment practices law. Instead, she brought a
common law action claiming that her discharge violated Maryland's
policy against sex discrimination. The court held that although her at-
will status exempted the plaintiff, she could use the state anti-discrimi-
nation law to establish Maryland policy that would support an excep-
tion to the employment-at-will rule.
There are strong arguments against the application of Williamson to
ordinances prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. Many courts
have held that the statutory remedies created by state fair employment
practice laws are exclusive, thereby precluding a common law wrongful
278. Logically, this argument also applies to the exclusion of sexual orientation dis-
crimination from Title VII, which one could claim has the policy of forbidding all dis-
crimination, not just the kinds specifically enumerated. Given the consistency with
which courts have resisted any attempts to include homosexuals within the coverage of
Title VII or state FEP laws, such an argument would probably be futile. See De Santis
v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp.
1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); Gay Law Students Ass'n v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 493, 595 P.2d 592, 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1979)
(the California Fair Employment Act does not encompass sexual orientation
discrimination).
279. 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1335 (Cir. Ct. Caroline Cty, Md., Dec. 11,
1981, published in 1986).
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discharge action.28 ° Little authority exists on the issue of whether mu-
nicipal fair employment practice laws create an exclusive remedy.2 81
Some statutes, such as those in Berkeley and San Francisco, specifically
allow a plaintiff to choose between an administrative remedy and a civil
suit for damages.282 In most cities, however, resolution of the issue
necessitates interpretation or litigation. In New York City, for exam-
ple, courts have yet to rule on this issue. The New York Human
Rights Law, however, explicitly gives plaintiffs a choice between a civil
action or the statutory remedy,2 83 and one might argue that the city by
not providing to the contrary intended to give the same choice.
Opponents of the application of the Williamson reasoning to laws
outlawing sexual preference discrimination will also argue that munici-
palities lack the power to enact them.2 84 In general, home rule cities
possess those powers conferred upon them by the state, powers neces-
sary to fulfill an express grant of power, and police power to legislate
for the general welfare of the citizenry.2 85 Most gay rights ordinances
280. See, e.g., Teale v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1976);
Johnson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 348 Mass. 168, 202 N.E.2d 816 (1964). The exclusivity
rule applies when a plaintiff brings a common law action alone or coupled with a claim
that a termination violates a FEP law. A few courts, however, have allowed remedies
on both common law and statutory grounds. See Chancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores,
672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 113 (1983); McKinney v. Na-
tional Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980).
281. Because of the availability of punitive compensatory damages, a plaintiff might
want to bring a civil action for wrongful termination in conjunction with a statutory
claim. When the pendant common law claim challenges the manner in which the dis-
charge was made rather than the right of the employer to terminate, courts are more
likely to allow it. L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL, § 6.10[6] (1986). See Craft v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 153 (W.D. Mo. 1983). For example, a homo-
sexual who is fired in an abusive manner in a jurisdiction prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination might combine his statutory claim with a cause of action for outrage or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such claims have been successful when cou-
pled with claims of sexual or racial harassment. See, e.g., Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F.
Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1982); Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523
(D.D.C. 1981); Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Con-
treras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1973).
282. Berkeley, Cal., Municipal Code § 13.28.090(b)(2); San Francisco, Cal., Munic-
ipal Code § 3307(c)(2) (1978).
283. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 1982).
284. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 5.02[d] n.42 (R. Achtenburg,
ed., 1985).
285. For a discussion of municipal law and the distinction between general law cit-
ies and charter cities, see I C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW chs. III & IV
(1978). For an in depth discussion of the powers of charter cities, see Sato, Municipal
Affairs in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1055 (1972).
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can be justified as an exercise of police power.286 A home rule city may
also legislate on municipal affairs, and gay rights ordinances can be
justified on that basis.287 Numerous challenges to a municipality's
power to pass anti-discrimination legislation have been litigated 288 and
full resolution of the issue depends on the intricacies of municipal law,
a topic outside the scope of this article.
V. THE TORT EXCEPTION
A. In General
In addition to the tort of wrongful discharge based on public policy
considerations, some commentators have advocated other tort causes
of action to remedy unjust dismissals.289 Courts have considered the
torts of abusive discharge based on employer malice or bad faith,290
intentional interference with contract, 91 fraud,292 negligence,293 inter-
286. See, eg., Berkeley, Cal., Municipal Code § 13.28 (1978); Madison, Wis., City
Code, Equal Opportunities Ordinance, § 3.23(1) (1975); Minneapolis, Minn., Code of
Ordinances, Civil Rights, § 945.010(a) (1975); Seattle, Wash., Fair Employment Prac-
tices Ordinances 102562, § 2 (Sept. 10, 1973).
287. Pearldaughter, Employment Discrimination Against Lesbians: Municioal Ordi-
nances and Other Remedies, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 537, 544-545 (1978).
288. See City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 239, 474 P.2d 976, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 8 (1970); People ex rel. Public Util. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952). Cf. Porter v. City of Oberlin, 1 Ohio St. 2d 143, 30
Ohio Ops. 2d 491, 205 N.E.2d 363 (1965) (city's determination that an anti-discrimina-
tion ordinance met community need was not clearly erroneous).
289. E.g., Blades, supra note 49 at 1427. See also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. I 111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Mongee v. Bebee Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549
(1974), modified by Howard v. Don Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).
Professor Blades favored a tort cause of action because he believed the availability of
punitive damages would deter employers from unjustly discharging employees. Blades,
supra note 49 at 1427. For a detailed discussion of the tort exception see L. LARSEN,
UNJUST DIsMISSAL §§ 4.01-4.10 (1985).
290. E.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (applying
Pa. law); Cloutier v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
291. Most courts agree that an employee at-will cannot recover on this theory. E.g.,
Cote v. Burroughs Welcome Co., 558 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying Virginia
and North Carolina law); Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 397 F. Supp. 889
(E.D. Wis. 1975) (applying Wis. law), aff'd, 530 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1976); Yaindl v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Division, 281 Pa. Super. Ct. 560, 422 A.2d
611 (1980); Ross v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 273 S.C. 764, 259 S.E.2d 814 (1979); Threlkeld
v. Christoph, 312 S.E.2d 14 (S.C. App. 1984).
292. E.g., Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1953) (applying
New Mexico law); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Har-
rison v. Fred S. James, P.A., 558 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Hamlen v. Fairchilds
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ference with the right to fair procedure,2 94 and the prima facie tort.2 95
Despite the early enthusiasm of commentators, courts have been reluc-
tant to adopt these causes of action.296 There are also a number of
independent torts which may be committed by an employer against an
employee. They include the torts of invasion of privacy, defamation,
interference with contractual relations, the infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and assault and battery.297 Since these torts are premised on a
duty owed by members of society generally, rather than on a duty
owed by an employer to his employees, detailed discussion of them is
outside the scope of this paper. It should be noted, however, that few
plaintiff-employees have recovered on these theories.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Some at-will employees have successfully asserted causes of action
against their former employees for the intentional infliction of emo-
Industries, Inc., 413 So. 2d 800 (Fla. App. 1982); Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. O'Neal, 224
Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647 (1982). But see Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 94 A.D.2d 280, 462
N.Y.S.2d 163 (1983), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 741, 465 N.E.2d 361, 476 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1984);
Waldman v. Englishtown Sportswear, Ltd., 92 A.D.2d 833, 460 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1983).
293. Two of the few courts considering this theory of recovery have rejected it.
Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 914 (1964); Alford v. Life Savers, Inc., 210 Neb. 441, 315 N.W.2d 260 (1982).
Michigan, however, has recognized that an employer undertaking an affirmative duty
towards an employee must perform the duty with reasonable care. Chamberlain v. Bis-
sell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (applying Michigan law); Schipani v.
Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
294. See Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977).
The right of fair procedure, which is similar to the federal constitutional right of due
process is recognized only in California. For a discussion of due process in the employ-
ment context, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
295. A prima facie tort is the performance of a lawful act intended to inflict harm
without justification. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904). This theory of
recovery is not available to discharged at-will employees either because jurisdictions do
not recognize the tort at all or refuse to recognize it in the employment context. See
Perdue v. J.C. Penney Co., 470 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying Texas law);
Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 293, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Ness v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). But see Lund-
berg v. Prudential Insurance Co., 661 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App. 1983).
296. See L. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL §§ 4.02(3], 4.05, 4.04, 4.10[1][3]; SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 5.03[3][a]-[e].
297. See Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985); SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW § 5.03[a]-[3] (R. Achtenberg ed. 1985). See generally W. KEETON & W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 117, 111-116A, 129 (5th ed. 1984).
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tional distress after being discharged in an extreme and outrageous
manner.298 The tort is a general one, not confined to the employment
context, and, as such, is not strictly speaking part of the emerging law
of unjust dismissal.299 The Restatement of Torts 2nd, Section 46, pro-
vides: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to lia-
bility for such emotional distress and, if bodily harm to the other re-
sults from it, for such bodily harm."3" The issue in most cases is
whether the conduct of the tort feasor is "extreme and outrageous,"
defined as conduct "so outrageous and extreme as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community., 30 1
In the employment context, courts have been reluctant to find an
employer's conduct in discharging an employee to be extreme and out-
rageous.3°2 One line of cases, however, may be applicable to homosex-
uals. 30 3 In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc.304 the discharge of a
298. Agis v. Howard Johnson, 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); Alcorn v.
Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216 (1970); see
Novosell v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Hubbard v.
United Press International, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (1983); Rawson v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982); Richey v. American Automobile Assn., Inc., 380
Mass. 835, 406 N.E.2d 675 (1980). See also Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St.
2d 245, 75 Ohio Ops. 2d 791, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976).
299. See generally W. KEETON & W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (5th ed.
1984).
300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
301. Id. at § 46 comment d.
302. The termination of employment will not alone constitute extreme or outra-
geous conduct. Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Colo.
1983); Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 538 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Meyer
v. C&H Sugar Co., 20 E.P.D. % 30, 152 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 637 (9th Cir.
1981); Novosell v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Magru-
der v. Selling Areas Marketing, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Dowling v.
Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., 338 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1976). Nor will it be sufficient for
plaintiff to show that he or she was treated unfairly. Cutilli v. GAF Corp., 531 F. Supp.
71 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977); Paris v. Divi-
sion of State Compensation Ins. Fund, 517 P.2d 1353 (Colo. 1973).
303. See generally Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practi-
tioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 879 (1980); Annotation,
Liability of Employer, Supervisor or Manager for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing
Employee Emotional Distress, 86 ALR 3d 454 (1978).
304. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216 (1970). Accord Shaffer v. Na-
tional Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Penn. 1983); Agarval v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d
932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88
Wash. 2d 735, 65 P.2d 1173 (1977).
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black employee was accompanied by loud and humiliating racist epi-
thets by his white supervisor, who was aware of the employee's special
sensitivity to racial discrimination. The California Supreme Court held
that a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the supervisor's con-
duct was "extreme and outrageous." Although no case has addressed
the issue, the reasoning of Alcorn applies to the discharge of a homo-
sexual accompanied by anti-homosexual slurs and other verbal abuse.
In Moye v. Gary,3" 5 however, the plaintiff's supervisor called an appar-
ently heterosexual plaintiff a "fag" and a "poor woman." The court
refused to find that the employer's abuse was outrageous or extreme.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past fifteen years the emerging law of unjust dismissal has
created substantial protection for many employees against the injustice
of the employment-at-will rule. This article examined the rights of the
homosexual employee within the context of this development and
showed that some protection is now available.3"6 A wrongfully dis-
charged homosexual can sue in all jurisdictions recognizing the public
policy exception. Homosexual plaintiffs in California also have a cause
of action based on the contract exception to the employment-at-will
rule, and in the future this exception will probably be accepted in other
jurisdictions. It is not unreasonable to predict that in the near future
many state courts will use either the implied-in-law or the implied-in-
fact contract theory to make it impossible for an employer to fire an
employee without just cause. Homosexuals as well as other employees
will benefit because in most instances mere homosexuality does not in-
terfere with the person's job performance.
The world has changed a great deal since Whitman wrote "I Sit and
Look Out," and legal change has helped ameliorate the condition of
305. 595 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
306. Plaintiffs have, in fact, already begun to plead the grounds of recovery investi-
gated in this article. See, e.g., Madsen v. Trustees, Christian Science Publishing Co.,
No. 58-574 (Super. Ct. Suffolk Cty. Mass. Dec. 1, 1982) (breach of contract and viola-
tion of public policy), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.,Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass.
715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985); Rueman v. Advanced Underwriters Insurance Agency,
Inc., No. 84-415382 (Cir. Ct. Mich. May 31, 1984) (breach of contract and violation of
public policy); Satori v. Society of American Military Engineers, No. 9008 (Cir. Ct.
Alexandria, Va. June 6, 1984) (wrongful discharge in tort and contract). These cases
are discussed at length in Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eight-
ies, Part 1, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459, 471-476 (1985). However, since the discussions
are based largely on the pleadings, they are of value primarily because they show the
theories of recovery and the kinds of arguments that can be used.
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laborers, the poor, and blacks. But the nature of injustice remains the
same, and it is just as wrong to fire a competent employee today merely
because he or she is a homosexual as it was to fire a poor man or a
Black without cause in Whitman's day. It is ironic that Walt Whitman
ended his poem with the lines, "All these-all the meanness and agony
without end I sitting/look out upon,/ see, hear, and am silent, °30 7 for
by recognizing and recording injustice, he laid the foundation for
change.*
307. THE TREASURY OF AMERICAN POETRY 263 (N. Sullivan ed. 1978).
* Editors' Note
Gay activitists gained a significant victory against sex based employment discrimina-
tion with the 9th Circuit decision in Watkins v. U.S. Army, 85-4006. The 9th Circuit
held that the federal government cannot bar persons from the armed services solely
because of their sexual preference. National Law Journal, Feb. 22, 1988, at 8. The 9th
Circuit found that an existing Army regulation that required homosexuals to be sum-
marily discharged violated the equal protection clause. Id. The court found that homo-
sexuals constitute a "suspect class" entitled to special protection from the judiciary. Id.
Homosexual rights advocates believe that the broadly written opinion affords anti-dis-
crimination protection throughout government. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/3
